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Abstract 
Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on climate policy, given the confluence of issues 
that are currently being debated, including the 2030 Energy and Climate Framework and the 
review of the EU carbon leakage list by 2014. Carbon leakage is the result of asymmetrical 
carbon policies, especially carbon pricing, and the resulting carbon cost, which affects the 
international  competitive  position  of  some  EU  industry  and  could  displace  production 
and/or investment, and the emissions of the activities displaced.  
This  paper  identifies  the  difference  between  carbon  price  and  carbon  cost  to  leakage-
exposed industry as one of two fundamental issues to be understood and addressed; lack of 
visibility on future climate policies and anti-leakage provisions is the other key issue. While 
this is a global issue, most of the experience has been accumulated in the EU. Carbon leakage 
is  only  one  of  the  factors  that  could  affect  the  competitive  position  of  sectors,  but  it  is 
difficult to attribute the impact of carbon costs versus other variables such as energy costs, 
labour, etc. Studies have predicted the risk of a significant amount of production leakage in a 
number of energy-intensive industries. To address the danger, they were included in the EU 
ETS  carbon  leakage  list,  which  gave  them  access to  free  allowances.  However,  a  limited 
number of studies undertaken after the end of the second trading period (2012) show little 
evidence of production leakage and asks the question whether the issue has not been blown 
out of proportion.  
The paper argues that the past may not be a good representation of the future, as it was 
heavily influenced by a high level of free allocation, the exceptional economic downturn, CO2 
prices significantly below what was anticipated, as well as the potential for changes in some 
fundamental variables such as the shrinking pool of allowances available for free allocation. 
It emphasises the need for a well-informed debate in the EU on measures to address carbon 
leakage post-2020, underpinned by a number of options, and objective criteria to evaluate 
those options. It emphasises that the debate should cover both investment and production 
leakage, caused by both direct and indirect carbon costs. 
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and Wijnand Stoefs* 
1.  Introduction 
This Special Report, prepared as a background paper by the CEPS Carbon Market Forum 
for the Carbon Leakage Project, should be seen as a primer that provides policy-makers, 
politicians,  regulators  and  industry  with  a  document  that  is  easily  readable  and  yet 
sufficiently rigorous to be illuminating, and which outlines the issues and why they are 
important. The depth of the discussion is therefore limited at times by the desire to keep 
the length of the paper manageable. 
The  paper  is  meant  to  paint  a  picture,  and  not  to  engage  in  a  policy  debate  and  a 
thorough review of options. That discussion will take place in a second paper, which will 
be delivered by the Carbon Leakage Project at a later date. 
The main questions explored in the paper include:  
o  What is carbon leakage? 
o  What may cause carbon leakage? 
o  What are the implications of carbon leakage? 
o  How does carbon leakage manifest itself? 
o  In the context of carbon-pricing mechanisms that have been developed, or are being 
developed around the world:  
  What  are  the  provisions/mechanisms  to  determine  whether  there  is  risk  of 
carbon leakage? 
  What are the provisions to prevent carbon leakage? 
o  What is the current state of the debate on carbon leakage in the EU? 
o  What are the relevant issues in international negotiations that are related to carbon 
leakage? 
2.  The Economics of Carbon Leakage 
2.1  Definition 
In order to address the issue of carbon leakage, there is a need to first agree on what it 
is, what causes it and what are its consequences. Lack of agreement in the EU and/or 
globally  on  these  fundamentals  will  only  complicate  the  search  for  an  efficient  and 
acceptable solution.  
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In fact, there are two sides to the issue. Firstly, how do we determine whether carbon 
leakage is a threat and what sectors and/or products are at risk? The second part of the 
problem is to determine what options are available to prevent carbon leakage and how 
to evaluate the effectiveness of those options.  
Broadly  speaking,  carbon  leakage  can  be  defined  as  the  displacement  of  economic 
activities and/or changes in investment patterns, that directly or indirectly cause GHG 
emissions  to  be  displaced  from  a  jurisdiction  with  GHG  constraints,  to  another 
jurisdiction, with no or less GHG constraints. Visible carbon pricing through a cap-and-
trade system is the most commonly used example of a climate change constraint that 
may lead to leakage. For further illustration, a number of other definitions put forward 
by well-known institutions are presented below.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) uses a ratio to define 
carbon leakage as: “The increase in CO2 emissions outside the countries taking domestic 
mitigation action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries.” 
The IPCC illustrates this as follows:  
It has been demonstrated that an increase in local fossil fuels prices resulting, for 
example,  from  mitigation  policies  may  lead  to  the  re-allocation  of  production  to 
regions with less stringent mitigation rules (or with no rules at all), leading to higher 
emissions in those regions and therefore to carbon leakage. Furthermore, a decrease in 
global fossil fuel demand and resulting lower fossil fuel prices may lead to increased 
fossil fuel consumption in non-mitigating countries and therefore to carbon leakage as 
well. However, the investment climate in many developing countries may be such that 
they  are  not  ready  yet  to  take  advantage  of  such  leakage.  Different  emission 
constraints in different regions may also affect the technology choice and emission 
profiles in regions with fewer or no constraints because of the spillover of learning. 
The EU ETS Directive has a number of ways in which it defines carbon leakage. Recital 
24 of Directive 2009/29/EC defines it as follows:  
In the event that other developed countries and other major emitters of greenhouse 
gases do not participate in this international agreement, this could lead to an increase 
in greenhouse gas emissions in third countries where industry would not be subject to 
comparable  carbon  constraints  (carbon  leakage),  and  at  the  same  time  could  put 
certain energy-intensive sectors and subsectors in the Community which are subject to 
international  competition  at  an  economic  disadvantage.  This  could  undermine  the 
environmental integrity and benefit of actions by the Community. 
Paras 15-17 of Directive 2009/29/EC provides the condition under which a sector or 
subsector is deemed to be at risk of carbon leakage (this is discussed further below).  
Finally, the DG Climate Action website defines carbon leakage as: 
The term often used to describe the situation that may occur if, for reasons of costs 
related to climate policies, business were to transfer production to other countries 
which have laxer constraints on GHG emissions. This could lead to an increase in their 
total emissions. The risk of carbon leakage may be higher in certain energy-intensive 
sectors. 
The OECD’s definition focuses more on the environmental impact of carbon leakage:  
Carbon leakage can be defined as the ratio of emissions increase from a specific sector 
outside the country (as a result of a policy affecting that sector in the country) over the 
emission reductions in the sector (again, as the result of the environmental policy) 
(Reinaud, 2008).  CARBON LEAKAGE: AN OVERVIEW  3 
 
While  these  definitions  may  appear  as  straightforward  and  uncontroversial,  the 
challenge  remains  in  how  to  differentiate  the  shift  in  emissions  and  the  changes  in 
production and investment patterns caused by climate policy, from what is attributable 
to other drivers. It seems like another counterfactual debate, similar to the one many are 
familiar with from discussions on additionality in the clean development mechanism 
(CDM).  
The definition that we work from must not only acknowledge production relocation (or 
production  leakage),  but  also  encompass  investment  displacement  (or  investment 
leakage) caused by climate policies. If that is not the case, it will give the wrong signals 
and possibly err in determining whether carbon leakage is taking place or not. 
2.2  Impacts and forms of carbon leakage 
2.2.1  Impacts 
The impacts of carbon leakage can be divided into environmental and socio-economic 
impacts.  The  environmental  impacts  are  the  result  of  emissions  migrating  from  a 
jurisdiction with carbon constraints/pricing to one without, or with different levels of 
carbon  pricing.  Environmental  leakage  is  important  as  it  can  reduce,  and  may  even 
reverse, the environmental outcomes that we seek through the imposition of a carbon 
price.  
The environmental impact could be measured through the carbon leakage ratio. Reinaud 
(2008) defines this as:  
The ratio of emissions increases from a specific sector outside the country (as a result 
of a policy affecting that sector in the country) over the emission reductions in the 
sector (again, as a result of the environmental policy).  
Besides  environmental  leakage,  there  are  two  other  aspects  that  can  impact  the 
sustainability of policies that introduce carbon pricing: social and economic/competitive 
aspects.  Economic  impacts  include  investment  avoidance,  investment  relocation  and 
shifting of production (including impacts on the value chain) outside the jurisdiction 
imposing  carbon  constraints.  The  social  impacts  –  closely  linked  to  the  economic 
impacts  –  are  due  to  job  losses  and  the  resulting  changes  to  livelihoods  and 
communities. 
2.2.2  Forms of carbon leakage 
Carbon leakage can take place internally, within the EU, or externally, that is between 
the EU and its trading partners. Internal leakage in the EU ETS has been identified as 
potentially occurring in two main forms.  
Firstly,  several  member  states  are  more  reliant  on  coal  or  other  carbon  fuels  for 
electricity production or industrial activity and so face higher carbon costs and could 
lose  competitiveness  vis-à-vis  other  member  states.  Secondly,  the  thresholds  for 
installations to enter the EU ETS might have a perverse effect as they are correlated to 
the size of installations.  
Internal leakage can also occur within jurisdictions where sub-national regimes impose 
a  carbon  price,  and  there  are  no  equivalent  policies  in  the  rest  of  the  national 
jurisdiction. Such examples can be cited for California, RGGI, WCI states in the US and 
WCI Canadian provinces.  4  MARCU, EGENHOFER, ROTH & STOEFS 
 
With  respect  to  provisions  to  address  internal  leakage,  for  illustration  purposes, 
California  has  put  in  place  measures  to  address  this  issue  by  requiring  that  entities 
importing  and  distributing  electricity  generated  out-of-state,  must  account,  and  are 
responsible, for the embedded emissions.  
We must emphasise that while we recognise the importance of a discussion on internal 
leakage, the remit of this project is to focus on ‘external’ carbon leakage, that is, between 
the EU and other countries.  
2.2.3  Channels for carbon leakage 
Another way to examine carbon leakage is the channels through which it is delivered, 
and the time-horizons. From this point of view the most relevant are: 
  Production leakage is the impact on short-term competitiveness which is due to 
differences in cost structure between GHG activities in GHG-constrained jurisdictions 
and  less  or  differently  GHG-constrained  jurisdictions.  The  former  could  lose 
competitiveness, which might lead to a loss of market share to the latter. This takes 
place  on  the  international  stage  between  the  same  sectors.  It  must  be  also 
emphasised that internalising carbon costs in an asymmetrical way affects exports as 
much as competitiveness in internal markets. 
  Investment  leakage,  which  is  a  long-term  impact,  is  the  result  of  loss  of 
competitiveness caused by climate policies that is high enough to shift investment to 
jurisdictions that have not taken similar measures. 
  Changes in global fossil-fuel prices changes in global fossil-fuel prices. While this 
avenue for carbon leakage is recognised in this study, it will not be the focus of this 
project.  
While we acknowledge the importance of all three channels described above, the remit 
of this project is to focus on short-term competitiveness and investment leakage only. 
2.3  What causes carbon leakage? 
There are many issues,  beyond climate policies, carbon prices and carbon costs that 
affect competitiveness and changes in trade and investment patterns. It is difficult to 
separate the impacts of each of them individually. Carbon pricing is one of them, but just 
one of many.  
Competitiveness  can  be  defined  at  either  a  national  or  a  sectoral  level,  whereas 
competitiveness  on  a  sectoral-level  is  the  more  relevant  when  discussing  carbon 
leakage. The OECD offers the following definition for sectoral competitiveness:  
In theory, the competitiveness of a sector in a region vis-à-vis another region is defined 
as its ability to maintain profits and market share.  
Moreover:  
A  substantial  increase  in  costs  for  a  sector  in  one  region  (entailing  loss  in  profits 
compared to international competitors) would affect an industry’s competitiveness (its 
ability to retain market shares) through various  ways: enhanced competition from 
cheaper competitors on domestic and overseas markets, lower profits leading to lower 
capacity to invest and expand activities (Reinaud, 2008).  CARBON LEAKAGE: AN OVERVIEW  5 
 
Carbon leakage is one of the factors that influence competitiveness. Other elements will 
weigh heavily, including energy, labour, general price of regulation, etc. Each of them 
will  have  a  different  weight,  depending  on  the  characteristics  of  the  industry  and 
product.  
Some  factors  can  be  influenced  by  the  EU  (for  instance  carbon  pricing,  labour  and 
environmental  regulation,  etc.)  while  others  cannot  (global  cost  of  raw  materials  or 
energy).  
2.3.1  Asymmetrical carbon policies 
Carbon leakage is caused by asymmetrical climate policies, that is, policies that impose a 
price for carbon in one jurisdiction, while another jurisdiction has no, or less stringent, 
climate policies and/or prices.  
Asymmetrical  climate  polices  have  their  roots  in  the  UNFCCC  and  the  concept  of 
common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), which in its current interpretation, 
resulted  in  the  Annex  B/  non  Annex  B  differentiation  between  parties  in  the  Kyoto 
Protocol (KP). 
In the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries took the lead to reduce emissions, with the 
understanding that the costs of doing so would be mitigated through the availability of 
offsets  from  developing  countries,  which  would  lower  their  cost  of  compliance.  The 
CBDR principle includes developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol and facilitates their 
sustainable development. It also helps with the transfer of technology, leads to an early 
switch to a less carbon-intensive development – and provides the ability to contribute 
more to mitigation actions under future climate regimes.  
Also, the world of emissions and GDP was different when the KP was adopted than it is 
now.  At  that  time  it  was  deemed  acceptable  to  provide  support  for  sustainable 
development, through instruments such as the CDM. While  support for development 
was seen as acceptable and desirable, support that helps competition in a world that has 
significantly changed since the UNFCCC was agreed in Rio de Janeiro at the UNCED in 
1992 and the KP adopted, has become a controversial issue, questioned by many. Echoes 
of  this  evolution  can  also  be heard  in  the  rise  and  fall  of  CDM  credits  from  rapidly 
emerging economies.  
The idea of carbon markets was advocated in Kyoto by the US and was included in the 
KP. The EU was a trailblazer and introduced a domestic cap-and-trade to help meet its 
KP obligations. A price of carbon was imposed on many of its industries at a time when 
its competitors from emerging economies, as well as from some developed countries, 
did not face the same costs. Many countries today, however, are catching up with EU.  
2.3.2  A changing world 
Carbon leakage was not much of a concern at the time when the KP was negotiated. 
Today, GDP statistics look rather different when compared to 1997 (Table 1), and the 
same holds true for CO2 emissions (Table 2). 
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Table 1. GDP in selected global economies, 1997 and 2011 
Country  GPD 1997 
($ bn. in PPP) 
Share worldwide 
GDP, 1997 (%) 
GDP 2010 
($ bn. in PPP) 
Share 
worldwide 
GDP, 2011 (%) 
∆ 1997-2011, 
share worldwide 
GDP, in % 
China  2,285.33  6.297  1,0128.4  13.562  115.4 
India  1,251.59  3.449  4,051.36  5.425  57.3 
Singapore  112.4  0.31  293.69  0.39  25.81 
Russia  965.11  2.659  2,237.41  2.996  12.7 
Chile  133.49  0.368  276.8  0.371  0.8 
South Africa  263.26  0.725  526.95  0.706  -2.6 
Brazil  1,125.57  3.012  2,186.54  2.928  -2.8 
Saudi Arabia  314.94  0.868  628.93  0.842  -3.0 
Australia  444.15  1.224  877.22  1.175  -4.0 
Indonesia  523.76  1.443  4,051.36  1.385  -4.0 
Mexico  887.66  2.43  1,569.89  2.1  -13.6 
UK  1,273.62  3.51  2,223.25  2.977  -15.2 
US  8,332.35  22.961  14,498.93  19.414  -15.5 
EU-27  9,124.47  25.143  15,283.06  20.464  -18.6 
Germany  1,914.29  5.275  2,957.38  3.96  -24.9 
Japan  3,105.05  8.556  4,384.48  5.871  -31.4 
World  3,6246.7  100  74,683.81  100    
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook 2012. 
Table 2. CO2 emissions in selected global economies (in thousands of metric tonnes of CO2), 
1997 and 2009 
Country  1997  2009  Growth (%) 
Australia  333,624  395,094  18.4 
Brazil  300,547  367,147  22.2 
Chile  56,171  672 67  19.8 
China  3,469,510  7,692,211  121.7 
Germany  862,277  732,249  -15.1 
India  1,043,940  1,982,263  89.9 
Indonesia  278,659  453,106  62.6 
Japan  1,201,632  1,100,650  -8.4 
Mexico  358,383  446,237  24.5 
Russia  1,559,238  1,574,368  1.0 
Saudi Arabia  216,239  431,027  99.3 
Singapore  69,240  24,767  -64.2 
South Africa  371,328  503,941  35.7 
UK  545,573  475,108  -12.9 
US  5,419,441  5,311,840  -2.0 
EU-27  3,952,562  3,573 607  -9.6 
Source: UNstat, Millenium Development Goals Indicator. CARBON LEAKAGE: AN OVERVIEW  7 
 
Changes in economic development and emissions statistics must also be combined with 
the  fact  that  we  live  today  in  a  more  globalised  world,  where  trade,  especially  in 
commoditised goods, has increased dramatically (see Figures 1 and 2). The same holds 
true for investment patterns.  
Figure 1. World merchandise trade, value of export ($ mil.) 
 
Source: WTO statistics database. 
Figure 2. Export of semi-finished and finished steel products (thousand metric tonnes) 
 
Sources: Steel Statistical Yearbook, 2000, 2003 and 2012. 
At the same time as trade flows increased, production capacity of many energy-intensive 
industries in developing countries has also increased significantly. Figure 3 illustrates 
for the steel sector crude steel production from 2001 to 2012. Led by China, capacity has 
increased at a steep pace. Production in the EU decreased in 2009 as a result of the 
economic crisis, which has been followed by a weak recovery in the following three 
years.  
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Figure 3. Global production of crude steel, 2001-12 (thousands of tonnes) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Renda et al. (2013b). 
The figures and tables above present well-known statistics, but they are worth briefly 
highlighting  as  they  point  out  that  some  developing  countries  have  now  become 
significant emitters of GHGs (China is now no. 1 in the world), and many developing 
countries  have  advanced  to  become  significant  economic  powers  and  competitors  in 
many sectors at the global level.  
As such, the old paradigms that the Kyoto Protocol was built on and in which carbon 
leakage was not a concern simply do not reflect today’s realities. In many cases the shift 
in  investment  and  production  capacity has  resulted in  slack  capacity  being  available 
outside the EU and other OECD countries, creating different trade patterns for the EU, 
and accompanying GHG emissions.  
The  significant  shift  in  trade  patterns  has  also  given  rise  to  the  discussion  about 
production and consumption patterns for GHG emissions. 
2.3.3  Carbon prices: Visible vs shadow 
One way of looking at what causes carbon leakage is to examine the way carbon prices 
emerge. They can be visible resulting from a cap-and-trade regime, or they can result 
from other policies and measures that are intended to address climate change, have a 
mitigation impact and produce a de facto carbon price, which is not explicit. Policies 
without a visible carbon price will impose a ‘shadow’ price for carbon. As a result of the 
reductions  they  trigger,  shadow  carbon  contribute  to  lowering  the  visible  price  of 
carbon. 
A number of examples include:  
  The Renewable Energy Directive and the Energy Efficiency Directive produce carbon 
prices in the EU that are not visible. They contribute to GHG reductions and reduce 
the amount of ‘work’ the EU ETS must do in order to reach its targets. The impact is 
lower EUA prices. 
  The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (also known as Assembly Bill 
32), is the basis for the California cap-and-trade programme, but also of a number of 
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Complementary  Measures  that  produce  a  much  higher  ‘shadow’  price.  One  such 
example is the Low Carbon Fuel Standard. In this case, California has made a choice 
to aim for low visible carbon prices from it ETS. 
  Comparing domestic actions for low-carbon electricity generation, Vivid Economics 
(2010) concludes that mandating the use of certain types of technologies in China in 
the coal sector leads to a higher implicit carbon price in China than for example in 
Australia or the US.  
  Taxes on energy can be a powerful tool to influence patterns of energy use.  
  Regulatory  standards  -  The  impact  of  the  limitation  on  plant  emissions  being 
proposed  in  the  US  by  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  through  the 
recently announced “Carbon Pollution Standard for New Power Plants” will need to 
be quantified. The limitation may not constitute a direct carbon price but it could 
have a significant impact. There are also discussions on whether states could use 
their regional ETS as an alternative to meet these standards.  
The recent OECD report on “Climate and carbon: Aligning prices and policies” (OECD, 
2013) recognises that ‘shadow prices’ resulting from “using feed-in tariffs and capital 
subsidies are on average (note: over all OECD countries) €169 per tonne and €176 per 
tonne respectively, with high estimates in individual countries of up to almost €800 per 
tonne”. 
It must also be highlighted that studies on carbon leakage that are referenced in this 
report, as well as most, if not all, of the existing literature, do not include shadow prices, 
but focus on visible carbon prices.  
2.3.4  Carbon prices and carbon costs 
Beyond the actions that result in a carbon price, it is also important to examine what 
imposes a carbon cost. A difference must be made between carbon prices, which is the 
result  of  the  constraint  (e.g.  cap  and  trade)  and  carbon  cost  (the  cost  to  meet  the 
obligation by those that have to meet carbon constraints). 
There are different types of carbon costs: 
1.  Direct costs  are  the  result  of  meeting  emissions  constraints  and  result  from  the 
procurement of compliance instruments, e.g. EUAs to meet emissions. 
2.  Indirect costs are the price of emissions allowances that need to be surrendered by 
electricity producers and that are passed through to electricity consumers. Electric 
utilities face increased production costs through their ETS compliance costs. They 
pass  those  costs  on  to  their  customers  via  higher  electricity  rates.  Industrial 
consumers  therefore  face  an  extra  cost  because  of  the  cost  of  CO2  embedded  in 
electricity  prices.  The  pass-on  rate  of  the  CO2  cost  for  producing  electricity  is  a 
number that is subject to intense debate and may vary significantly between member 
states. The indirect costs are calculated as: Electricity intensity of production x Carbon 
intensity of electricity x CO2 price x Pass-on rate. 
3.  Administrative costs are related to compliance with carbon legislation, for instance 
MRV, back-office operations, etc. 
In addition to the cost of carbon, there are other important factors that will determine if 
a sector or product is at risk. Some of the criteria that need to be considered when 
examining if a sector is at risk of carbon leakage may include: 10  MARCU, EGENHOFER, ROTH & STOEFS 
 
  Direct CO2 intensity from process or energy use 
  Use of energy that internalises CO2 costs – electricity-intensive industries 
  Use of components or semi-finished products that internalise CO2 costs 
  Trade intensity 
  Importance of the cost of carbon relative to other variables 
  Ability to pass costs downstream or through to consumers 
  Abatement potential or cost of abatement 
2.3.5  Pass-through of carbon prices 
One element in the list above that deserves further elaboration is the ability to pass 
through carbon costs. Asymmetrical climate policies and carbon costs do not necessarily 
result in carbon leakage unless they become a cost that impacts competitiveness.  
The availability of data on the pass-through of carbon costs is scarce and difficult to 
evaluate; hence, this criterion is not always (if at all) included in assessments on carbon 
leakage. 
If costs can be passed through, then the risk of carbon leakage diminishes or disappears, 
depending on the percentage of pass-through. If, on the other hand, costs cannot be 
passed through, due to international competition or global pricing mechanisms, profit 
margins will be eroded.  
The  elements  that  will  impact  the  ability  to pass  through  costs  are  several  (see  e.g. 
Reinaud, 2008 and Droege & Cooper, 2010):  
  Exposure to international competition  
  Market concentration 
  Product differentiation 
  Available substitutes that are less emissions-intensive or energy-intensive  
  Transport cost relative to CO2 cost 
  Exchange rate risks 
  Customer reaction to a price increase, based on: vertical integration of the industry, 
quality issues and long term contracting 
  Legal and political environment 
  Global pricing mechanism 
An additional important element is the market structure of the EU ETS with the top 15% 
emitters accounting for 90% of total EU ETS emissions and the power and heat sector 
dominating with a share of about 73% of emissions. 
While  in  principle  asymmetric  carbon  constraints  and  prices  will  affect  industrial 
competitiveness  and the economy as a whole, some  specific industries and products 
could be affected more severely (Reinaud, 2008). For example Hourcade et al. (2008) 
found  that  emissions-intensive  industries  represent  1%  of  the  UK  GDP  and the Öko 
Institute (2008) found that they represent 2% of German GDP.  
Costs tend to be concentrated in a limited number of sectors, and benefits dispersed 
both  within  an  economy  and  inter-generationally  (Drew,  2010;  Lennox  et  al.,  2013). 
When analysing carbon leakage and competition, this is an important factor to take into 
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As such, an important observation is that measures to address carbon leakage need to be 
targeted, and the right instruments must be used to ensure that those that really need 
assistance to address leakage can get it.  
2.3.6  Criteria and sectors at risk 
The most-often cited sectors and products that are potentially at risk of carbon leakage 
include:  
  Cement 
  Aluminium 
  Iron and steel 
  Paper 
  Refineries 
  Chemicals1  
A number of studies point to these sectors as being at risk from carbon leakage and are 
discussed below. The criteria that are used most often in evaluating the risk of carbon 
leakage  are  the  significance/relative  importance  of  the  cost  of  carbon  and  trade 
intensity.  
The European Commission uses these two criteria in evaluating the risk of leakage and 
the sectors mentioned above are plotted in Figure 6 using data from Annex II of the 
2009  Impact  Assessment  for  ETS  costs  over  Gross  Value  Added  (GVA)  and  trade 
exposure.  
Figure 4. Selection of sectors plotted by trade exposure and total ETS costs/GVA  
 
Note: Sectors at NACE-4 code level. 
Source: Authors’  elaboration  on  Annex  II  of  the  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  initial  EU  ETS 
Carbon Leakage List (European Commissions, 2009a) 
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The EU used these results to determine which sectors were placed on the initial EU ETS 
carbon leakage list in 2009 and to show those sectors grouped that meet the criteria 
devised. Some extremes, on one dimension, such as cement, are included in the diagram 
in recognition of the extreme impact that carbon costs may have. 
Figure  5  shows  exposure  to  leakage  in  a  different  way,  also  using  the  quantitative 
assessment conducted by the European Commission (European Commission, 2009a). 
Figure 5. Quantitative assessments of the main sectors at risk of carbon leakage 
 
Note: Column on the left denotes CO2 cost and the column on the right, trade intensity. 
Source: European Commission (2009a). 
Most of the data that shows sectors at risk come from ex-ante models to assess the 
impact of the EU ETS on carbon leakage in different sectors. There is limited ex post 
information, some of which is discussed in section 6.2 of this paper.  
According to Ecofys (2013), the potential scale of carbon leakage in the literature ranges 
from 2 to 73%,2 for sectors covered by EU ETS. The higher rates are often associated 
with higher carbon prices and no preventive measures such as free allocation.  
Moreover, the higher rates seem to be associated with simpler assumptions, such as 
homogenous products. The assessments with lower rates tend to assume low carbon 
prices and preventive measures such as free allocations.  
For cement, there have been a number of ex-ante studies that indicated that significant 
leakage could be expected. The order of magnitude obtained for leakage in these models 
depends on modelling assumptions, i.e. 14% for steel and non-metallic mineral products 
(which includes cement, glass and ceramics) in Fischer & Fox (2012), 50% in Demailly & 
Quirion (2008) and 70% in Ponssard & Walker (2008).  
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With respect to steel production, ex-ante studies by Ritz (2009) show that leakage could 
register between 9 and 75%, depending on assumptions on elasticity of demand and 
room  for  improving  carbon  efficiency  in  that  sector.  Higher  levels  of  possible 
improvements  in  carbon  efficiency  and  more  rigid  demand  for  steel  lead  to  lower 
leakage risks. Dröge and Cooper (2010) see a leakage risk of up to 39% to 2016, under 
certain assumptions (including full auctioning and no carbon pricing implemented by 
major trading partners).  
In the case of aluminium, not many ex-ante studies can be found. The work of Dröge and 
Cooper (2010) shows a risk of aluminium leakage of 21% to 2016. 
However, Droege and Cooper (2010), for example, believe that too many sectors appear 
on the list of sectors exposed to carbon leakage, due to inadequate choice or indicators 
and/or too low thresholds in the assessment. As an illustration, many sectors qualify 
based on the trade-intensity indicator, which implies that this threshold may have been 
set too low (Ecofys, 2013).  
3.  Leakage provision in current, proposed and 
contemplated carbon-pricing mechanisms 
This  section  reviews  the  anti-leakage  provisions  for  existing  and  emerging  carbon-
pricing  mechanisms.  In-depth  research  was  conducted  for  this  paper  on  nine  main 
mechanisms for carbon-pricing – the EU ETS, Australia, California, New Zealand, Quebec, 
South  Korea,  China,  RGGI  and  the  Waxman-Markey  bill.  A  separate  Fact  Sheet  was 
prepared on each mechanism and appended in the Annex to this paper.  
This section also includes an Overview, which summarises and analyses the provisions 
in each of the systems researched and reviewed on the basis of a number of key axes: 
  Leakage list and free allocation 
  Compensation and support measures 
  Offsets 
  Linking 
In general, provisions for carbon leakage can be divided into two main groups those 
whose actions can be implemented unilaterally and require little or no international 
cooperation, and those measures whose application requires significant international 
cooperation.  
Purely domestic or unilateral actions could include free allocation based on benchmarks, 
free allocation based on output levels or revenue-recycling measures. The latter could 
either be unconditional or tied to innovation efforts.  
Purely domestic measures may need to be complemented by others that may have a 
broader range and also cover impact on exports. Among the measures that have been 
repeatedly  referred  to  and  that  have  international  implications  are  border-tax 
adjustments, import quotas and technical regulations and standards.  
One example that has been at the centre of discussions recently is the set of measures 
aimed at aviation and maritime transportation. Since 2012, emissions from international 
aviation  are  included  in  the  EU  ETS.  However,  in  2013,  the  EU  decided  to  suspend 
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Civil  Aviation  Organization  (ICAO)  to  reach  a  global  agreement  on  tackling  aviation 
emissions.  
In  June  2013,  the  European  Commission  set  out  a  strategy  for  integrating  maritime 
emissions  into  the  EU’s  policy  for  reducing  domestic  GHG  emissions.  The  strategy 
includes MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification) of CO2 emissions from large ships 
using EU ports, GHG reduction targets for the maritime transport sector and further 
measures, including market-based measures, in the medium to long term.  
Aviation and maritime transportation are international sectors and  should be a case 
study  on  how  different  jurisdictions  can  cooperate  to  avoid  carbon  leakage.  The 
difficulty the EU is facing is a good example of the complexity of addressing this issue at 
the national level. 
We would like to conclude with by highlighting several issues. One is that this paper 
does not review or assess the adequacy of existing national solutions to address carbon 
leakage. The information is, and is intended to be, factual. Analysis of different options 
will  be  carried  out  in  the  second  deliverable  for  this  project  mentioned  in  the 
Introduction. 
The  second  remark  concerns  the  anti-leakage  provisions  in  different  national 
programmes  that  are  covered  in  this  section.  One  category  of  measures  addresses 
carbon leakage directly and covers sectors that are deemed to be at risk. A leakage list 
and free allocation fall in that category. 
However, there are many measures that are broader in coverage and represent more 
general cost mitigation. Cost mitigation also helps prevent carbon leakage but its general 
objective is to minimise costs. International offsets are in this category, as they have 
other  objectives  related  to  the  creation  of  a  global  carbon  market,  international 
negotiations, etc. In terms of addressing leakage concerns, offsets and free allocation can 
be  seen  as  choices,  in  which  case  those  that  have  obligations,  if  given  a  choice,  will 
almost certainly opt for free allocation. 
Finally,  there  are  some  measures  that  are  even  broader  such  as  linking  of  carbon 
markets, which aim to create a level playing field but also contribute to good market 
functioning through increased liquidity. 
3.1  Overview of carbon pricing mechanisms 
The anti-leakage provisions in the existing and emerging carbon-pricing mechanisms 
are outlined in the Fact Sheets in the Annex. There are many common features, but also 
significant differences. 
There are a number of other important dimensions in addition to the axes listed above. 
One  of  the  most  important  provisions  that  needs  be  closely  monitored  is  the 
predictability and stability of the measures. Are these measures here to stay? Do those 
who rely on them for investment decisions have a credible, long-term basis for making 
decisions? It is important to inquire whether the measures have sunset clauses, when 
the concept is up for review, and what elements need to be reviewed. 
Accompanying  and  complementary  characteristics  would  include  the  level  of 
transparency  and  flexibility.  How  are  these  decisions  made,  how  well  they  are 
understood,  and  how  predictable  is  the  process  to  stakeholders?  These  are  other 
important features. Also, having strict and clear rules is important, but rarely do rules CARBON LEAKAGE: AN OVERVIEW  15 
 
provide for every circumstance. Consequently, having the flexibility to allow adaptation 
to changing circumstances and to incorporate additional factors in the decision-making 
process is also important. 
The  reasons  for  establishing  carbon-market  mechanisms/emissions  trading  schemes 
may  vary,  and  this  has  an  impact  on  the  need  for  and  treatment  of  anti-leakage 
provisions. The EU ETS is seen, by some, as a tool for encouraging transition to a low-
carbon  economy,  which  requires  highly  visible  carbon  prices.  Leakage  has  therefore 
been an important element in the discussions and is becoming more so. In California, the 
cap-and-trade  (C-T) mechanism  is  seen as a  residual  mechanism  for  complementary 
measures, and seems to have set a low visible price for carbon as an objective.  
The  New  Zealand  ETS  was  set  up  to  ensure  that  the  country  reached  its  Kyoto 
commitments in a cost-effective manner. The system does not cap free allowances and 
has no limits on offsets. Transitional measures are also in effect: free allocation does not 
decrease on an annual basis, and several sectors need only surrender one allowance for 
every two tonnes of emissions produced. 
Finally, the carbon-pricing mechanisms and their anti-leakage provisions must be also 
looked upon from the perspective of time. As more is known, and as carbon prices play a 
more  significant  role  in  competitiveness,  provisions  to  address  the  threat  of  carbon 
leakage seem to bubble up to the top. 
3.2  Leakage lists and free allocation 
There are significant differences between the reviewed carbon-pricing mechanisms with 
respect to how activities or sectors that are at risk of carbon leakage are identified. The 
EU ETS, the California C-T, Australia’s CPM, Korea’s ETS and the Waxman-Markey Bill in 
the US all use criteria based on trade exposure and energy or emissions intensity (EITE) 
to define sectors at risk.  
Those sectors found to be at risk receive proportionally more free allocation. However, a 
wide variety of thresholds and definitions are used. 
The Korea ETS and the EU ETS use similar wording to describe their three quantitative 
thresholds. Both systems consider a sector at risk (or ‘significant’ risk in the EU ETS 
language) if it is either very trade-intensive, very emissions-intensive or a combination 
of the two (with lower thresholds): 
  Production costs increased by 5% and trade intensity is over 10% OR 
  Production costs increased by 30% OR 
  Trade intensity is over 30%. 
There  are  however  significant  differences  in  how  ‘increased  production  costs’  are 
defined. The EU leakage list includes both indirect and direct costs, while the Korean 
ETS expresses production costs solely in terms of direct costs: annual emissions of the 
sector times the price of allowances.  
This combination of trade exposure and emissions intensity can also be found in the 
California  C-T,  which  then  leads  to  a  classification  in  three  distinct  categories:  low, 
medium  or  high  Leakage  Risk.  Each  classification  leads  to  a  specific  level  of  free 
allocation and a specific slope of decreasing allocation. 
The Australian CPM includes different tiers of free allocation for sectors at risk as well. 
However,  in  this  system,  sectors  have  to  be  found  to  be  trade-exposed  before  an 16  MARCU, EGENHOFER, ROTH & STOEFS 
 
emissions-intensity criterion is applied. It is based on this second criterion that sectors 
are then categorised as either highly or moderately emissions-intensive activities.  
One important feature, which needs to be highlighted, is that contrary to the EU ETS and 
Korea’s  ETS,  the  level  of  emissions  intensity  is  not  based  on  production  costs,  but 
calculated as either tonnes of emissions over revenue (in millions of AUD – Australian 
dollars) or tonnes of emissions over value added (in millions of AUD).  
The New Zealand ETS also uses a measure of revenue to define emissions-intensity, but 
drops  any  mention  of  trade  exposure  to  decide  which  activities  are  eligible  for  free 
allocation. Free allocation is not only used to compensate for direct costs, but specific 
mention  is  also  made  of  using  it  to  compensate  for  decreased  values  of  assets  for 
businesses in the forestry and fishing sectors.  
In terms of flexibility, only the EU ETS combines quantitative criteria with qualitative 
ones. If an activity has borderline values on the quantitative criteria mentioned above, a 
set of qualitative criteria can be considered. Of the nearly 160 sectors and sub-sectors on 
the leakage list only six were included on a qualitative basis. 
Two  of  the  mechanisms  addressed  in  this  study  do  not  state  clear  thresholds  for 
eligibility  for leakage  provisions.  RGGI  currently  has  no  leakage  provisions, although 
member states have added the subject to the workload for the coming years. There are 
no anti-leakage provisions in the EU ETS for the power sector as the interconnections 
outside the EU are not significant. In contrast, RGGI states are interconnected in the 
North American grid on the East Coast, and as such there is a danger of leakage in this 
case. 
Quebec, which is member of the WCI, does have leakage provisions and a list of sectors 
that receive free allowances, but the process that resulted in the current list of sectors is 
not as transparent as it could be. 
ETS-wide free allocation was used in the EU ETS and will be used in the Korea ETS to 
protect businesses from carbon costs ONLY during the first phases of the respective 
schemes.  
One  could  speculate  that  free  allocation  programmes  were  copied  from  the  carbon-
pricing forerunner (the EU ETS), but free allocation is pervasive in the different carbon-
pricing  mechanisms  under  review  in  this  paper  and  the  similarities  are  superficial. 
Moreover, the mechanisms use very different methods and thresholds to identify which 
activities receive free allocation and how these allowances are distributed over time. As 
mentioned earlier, for example, the EU ETS is the only scheme that includes qualitative 
criteria  and  the  Australian  CMP  and  New  Zealand  ETS  uses  measures  of  revenue  to 
define emissions intensity. 
3.3  Compensation and support measures 
A  wide  variety  of  compensation  measures  is  included  in  the  various  carbon  pricing 
mechanisms.  These  measures  can  be  discussed  from  two  points  of  view:  who 
compensates and for what? 
The EU ETS allows member states to compensate their domestic industry for indirect 
ETS  costs.  However,  compensation  measures  require  approval  from  the  European 
Commission. This method could potentially lead to a fragmentation of compensation 
measures, and put a strain on the internal market. A significant feature is that the ETS is CARBON LEAKAGE: AN OVERVIEW  17 
 
an  EU-wide  programme,  while  a  fundamental  matter  –  how  enterprises  are 
compensated for indirect carbon costs – is handled at the member state level.  
Australia and Korea implement a sectoral-driven approach. Direct funding or support 
for  innovation  and  development  is  provided  to  specific  sectors  deemed  at  risk  of 
leakage. These sectors are generally very emissions-intensive industries (for example, 
coal-fired  generation  and  steel  production)  and  are  supported  in  their  transition 
towards a low-carbon future.  
Provisions  in  the  Waxman-Markey  Bill  and  the  California  C-T  aim  at  alleviating 
electricity-price increases for consumers. The Waxman-Markey Bill provides support at 
the source by compensating electricity and natural gas distributers directly, while the 
California C-T compensates consumers themselves. Electricity distribution utilities are 
granted free allocation (initially 90% of 2008 emissions, declining to 85% by 2020). 
Those allowances must be auctioned, and the full auctioning proceeds are earmarked to 
compensate ratepayers. 
3.4  Offsets 
Offsets  are  included  in  all  the  schemes  as  a  cost  containment  mechanism,  but 
implementation  varies  significantly  between  schemes,  primarily  with  respect  to  the 
types and quantities of offsets allowed. Every scheme analyzed in this paper uses both 
quantitative and qualitative restrictions for offsets. 
In  most  carbon  pricing  mechanisms  reviewed  there  is  a  clear  trend  of  allowing 
progressively more offsets into the system  as time passes. The EU is, in  some ways, 
maybe as it is the longest and biggest system in the world, and the one that has made the 
CER market possible so far, the one exception to this trend.  
In Phase 3 (2013-2020) fewer international credits will be accepted for compliance. In 
terms  of credits  for  post  2012  project,  only  those  originating  from  Least  Developed 
Countries are eligible.  
The quantitative restrictions allow offsets to be used until the quota for Phase 2 is used 
up,  plus  a  small  addition  for  Phase  3.  The  main  reasons  for  this  is  the  downwards 
pressure international credits have had on the price of EUAs, as well as the impact that 
CERs produced in emerging economies have on competitiveness. In the Australian CPM 
the opposite reasoning is prevalent: offsets are encouraged as a crucial cost containment 
mechanism. 
Qualitative restrictions have two dimensions: geographical and environmental. From a 
geographical perspective domestic offsets are frequently allowed in greater quantities 
and earlier on. The EU, while it has provisions in the EU ETS for domestic offsets, has not 
yet operationalised that provision. It seems it is the only system that does not have 
domestic offsets, except as it may be provided under JI. 
In the RGGI model and the China pilots, only domestic credits are accepted, with no 
indication that this will change in the nearby future. Korea ETS and Australia CPM do not 
allow any international offsets in their first periods, but from respectively 2021 and 
mid-2015 onwards these schemes open up to international credits. In the Australian 
case EUAs will be eligible for compliance from mid-2015 onwards, when the one-way 
link to the EU ETS was planned to be operational.  18  MARCU, EGENHOFER, ROTH & STOEFS 
 
California  and  Quebec  both  have  frameworks  to  accept  limited  international  offsets 
(though they must originate in Canada, USA and, in the case of California, Mexico ), but 
both the types and levels of acceptable international offsets are set to increase in the 
nearby future due to the upcoming link between both schemes. 
The  other  side  of  qualitative  limits  is  the  restrictions  used  in  terms  of  accepted 
protocols. Each mechanism has a list of accepted offset-protocols, but most have a clear 
mechanism to review and possibly accept new protocols. Offsets are not only linked to 
direct  emission  reductions,  but  frequently  projects  on  forestry  or  ozone  depleting 
substances are allowed. 
3.5  Linking 
At the moment two links are planned. Links can be either horizontally (between distinct 
jurisdictions)  or  vertically  (between  overlapping  mechanisms  within  the  same 
geographic area, but different levels of governance) (OECD, 2013). Both announced links 
are horizontal.  
A recent OECD study seeks to quantify and model the potential advantages of linking 
between schemes (OECD, 2013b). The results show that linking can address some, but 
not  all  of  the  competitiveness  issues  arising  from  carbon  pricing.  Different  levels  of 
linking however lead to different results. The study reports that competitiveness and 
leakage effects from climate policies can be reduced in three ways: 
  more countries act and/or link 
  more emission sources are covered 
  climate mitigation policy is harmonised across countries (via linking for example) 
California and Quebec should link in 2014, but from a legislative point of view not all the 
necessary changes have been made in California. The California Air Resources Board is 
expected to  approve the necessary measures  at their next meeting in October 2013. 
Quebec has already streamlined its system to allow linking with California. No political 
hurdles remain for this full link and the first joint auction is proposed for January 2014.  
The phase-by-phase linking between Australia and the EU was set to start mid-2015, but 
is now uncertain due to the new government in Australia. Draft legislation was released 
on the 15th of October to scrap the Carbon Pricing Mechanism altogether. 
Three facets of linking are interesting. First, it provides a cost containment strategy for 
jurisdictions with high mitigation costs, for example in Australia. Second, it allows  a 
bottom-up movement towards an international or even global carbon market. Finally, if 
two  mechanisms  are  fully  linked,  the  issue  of  carbon  leakage  between  those  two 
mechanisms disappears. One of the main findings of the OECD Environmental Outlook to 
2050 is that macroeconomic and sectoral impacts of mitigation efforts are the largest 
when carbon pricing mechanisms are not linked (OECD, 2012).  
3.6  Post-2020 
A common denominator for all leakage provisions addressed in this paper is the lack of 
certainty  towards  the  future,  which  could  be  an  important  issue  for  investment 
decisions and hence investment leakage. The respective leakage lists in the California 
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end there. Australia and New Zealand initially has a fixed rate of 1.3% yearly decrease in 
free allocation, but in New Zealand this rate was put on indefinite hold. 
4.  International climate change regime 
Parties  to  the  UNFCCC  are  working  towards  a  new  international  climate  change 
agreement, to be completed by 2015, and which will enter into force by 2020. 
It must be expected that some aspects of the international climate change regime will 
have an impact on the domestic policies that countries will implement in order to meet 
their international commitments, including carbon-pricing policies.  
While carbon leakage and competitiveness are not items negotiated under UNFCCC, it is 
important  to  identify  those  aspects  of  the  global  agreement  that  may  translate  into 
carbon leakage concerns. 
Similarly, they way carbon markets will evolve globally post-2020 will also impact the 
discussions on carbon leakage. An outcome that will see a globally linked carbon market, 
with a global price of carbon, could start to address leakage concerns. A fragmented 
market, with different, or no carbon price in some jurisdictions, will result in increased 
stress regarding carbon leakage. As referred earlier, carbon costs is what will impact 
carbon leakage and competitiveness. 
Two issues in the international agreement are likely to impact the stance of countries 
will take with respect to carbon leakage: clarity on commitments, and the instruments 
that are being used to meet those commitments. 
With  respect  to  commitments  made  by  countries  under  a  post-2020  international 
agreement,  lack  of  clarity  (KP  had  a  clear  base  year  and  budgets)  will  increase 
suspicions  over  comparability  of  effort.  The  current  agreement  is  profiling  as  much 
more  heterogeneous,  with  everyone  making  some  commitment  in  its  own  way.  This 
makes these commitments more difficult to understand and compare.  
The  second  aspect  is  that  of  the  type  of  units  or  instruments  that  can  be  used  for 
compliance  with  international  obligations.  As  mentioned  above,  a  fragmented  and 
heterogeneous market is developing, with many mitigation units produced nationally, 
according to national protocols, and with an unknown mitigation value for international 
commitments.  
The more decentralised the system, with each country able to decide on the type of units 
that it can use for international compliance, the bigger the uncertainty on the level of 
effort that individual companies and installations have to undertake.  
Uncertainty on these dimensions could translate into lack of clarity, and reactions that 
will lead to measures oriented to avert what is perceived as policies that may lead to 
carbon leakage. 
From an EU perspective, to eliminate or reduce concerns related to carbon leakage, a 
2015 international climate change agreement would have, ideally, provisions for 
  Global participation by all countries, 
  Some link between the EU and the general level of ambition and 
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5.  Evolution and current situation 
5.1  Evolution 
Carbon leakage has been a significant topic of debate in all jurisdictions where a carbon 
pricing mechanism was introduced as part of the policies to address climate change. By 
observing the way these provisions were introduced, current provisions and parameters 
in different carbon pricing systems around the world, as well as the current issues that 
are emerging, we can draw a picture illustrating the evolution of thinking on this topic. 
Carbon pricing has a special impact on society, and the economy, and it is different from 
its role model, SO2 pricing in the US through cap and trade. It is much broader, multi-
sectoral, global in nature, with very different abatement costs, with inter- and intra-
generational reach, etc. Leakage impacts that emerge are slow to be recognised, as they 
may take time to become apparent, and the cause may be difficult to link to the effect. 
The result is an on-going debate, one that has evolved over time. 
The discussion on carbon leakage has been ongoing since the start of the EU ETS. It has 
had distinct periods when work was more intensive. However, as mentioned, the EU ETS 
is  by  no  means  the  only  jurisdiction  where  anti  leakage  discussions  have  figured 
prominently. An interesting case to be examined is that of the proposed US federal cap 
and trade legislation, which the US Congress never approved. 
5.1.1  EU discussion 
In the EU ETS, some of the work was done when the EU ETS Directive was initially 
introduced, but it was not extensive. At that time, the concern over carbon leakage was 
not significant given the fact that during the first trading period, 2005-07, all allocation 
was  free,  and  was  based  on  historical  emissions.  There  was  a  limited  provision  for 
auctioning, with the upper limit set at 5%. Some member states tested the auctioning 
process, but in a very limited way. 
Cost containment, which was meant to keep cost of compliance down, and implicitly 
address leakage concerns, was also addressed through the linking Directive that was 
introduced in 2004. There were few limits in the linking Directive on the number and 
type of international offsets that could be introduced in the system. 
In the second trading period, which spanned 2008-2012, little change was introduced. 
The cap for auctioning was raised to 10%. Some member states brought allowances to 
the market via auction. The amount of international offsets allowed in each National 
Allocation Plan (NAP) was proportional to the tightness of the cap through a complex 
formula that insured more access to “cheap” international offsets if the cap was set tight. 
However, as the financial crisis unfolded and recession started to bite, emissions from 
capped installations declined, and with them the price of carbon to levels which, coupled 
with  the  free  allocation,  lowered  the  concerns  about  carbon  leakage  for  the  second 
trading period. 
However, the EU ETS review that took place in 2008-2009, to enter into force in 2013 
for the third trading period, brought the discussion over carbon leakage again into focus. 
Competitiveness  and carbon  leakage were  significant  elements  of  the  review  debate. 
This was mainly triggered by changes in P3 of the EU ETS which included significant 
increases in auctioning, the introduction of benchmarking as an allocation method for 
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anticipated  an  international  Agreement  (Copenhagen  COP  15)  carbon  leakage  is  not 
incorporated post 2020. 
During  this  debate,  industry  had  strong  positions  with  significant  interventions  by 
various business associations and companies. One example of the type of concerns and 
examples that were provided during, and right after the review of the EU ETS in 2008-9, 
was the example provided by Hydro and that is captured in the box below, which shows 
the importance of the anti-leakage provisions adopted in the 2008-9 review.  
Box 1. The effect of compensation measures for indirect costs on corporate decisions by 
Hydro with respect to the Neuss plant 
In January 2009, the Corporate Management Board (CMB) decided to: ”...initiate a procedure 
with the intention of closing the electrolysis and carbon plant at Neuss as soon as possible“ 
since “….production is highly unprofitable and place a severe cash drain on Hydro”. 
However, the potential full closure discussion was overtaken by a discussion (June 2009) on 
partial closure due to continued dialogue with the German government on “full CO2 relief for 
2009, with the intention to continue through 2010-2012. A direct compensation for indirect 
CO2 related costs is from 2009 up to 2012 will represent a de-facto early implementation of 
the compensation regime for indirect CO2-costs opened up for in the ETS regime 2012-2020”. 
Signals from the German government included decisions on €40 million in support measures, 
stated to be worked to be fully conforming to EU rules. 
These  signals  were  taken  on  board  by  the  Hydro  CMB,  and  determined  to  be  of  vital 
importance for the continuation of production at the Neuss plant (July 2009 meeting). 
Source: Internal communication within Hydro. 
The initial proposal introduced by the EC included a provision for qualitative criteria to 
be  included  on  the  leakage  list.  There  were  no  quantitative  criteria  included  in  the 
original EC proposal.  
In  the  course  of  the  co-decision  process  Member  States,  and  especially  the  EU 
presidency held by France, asked for a more quantitative methodology, providing less 
political  latitude.  However,  it  must  also  be  recognized  that  qualitative  criteria  could 
introduce more flexibility for a more thorough means of evaluating risk (it can look at 
abatement potential, market characteristics, etc.) 
The carbon leakage list (CLL) was, and is, central to the anti-leakage provisions in the EU 
ETS.  The  dimensions  that  are  considered  for  being  included  in  the  CLL  are  carbon 
intensity and trade intensity (see Annex 1, Factsheet 1). In doing the initial analysis, the 
position  of  different  sectors  in  the  EU  energy  intensive  industries  could  be  plotted 
against these axes (similar to Figure 6 above).  
One key number that was used to test for inclusion on the CLL was a carbon price of 30 
Euros (included in the Impact Assessment accompanying the package of implementation 
measures for the EU’s 20-20-20 targets). At that time, given the evolution of carbon 
prices, this sounded like a very reasonable forecast, maybe even conservative. 
The other factors, the combined 5% (CO2 cost) and 10% (trade exposure), came from an 
internal EC study. The 30% for carbon cost (as stand-alone test), was a more political 
choice, driven by the desire to ensure that certain sensitive industrial sectors, with a 
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The additional 30% test for trade intensity was enshrined to same degree to ensure 
symmetry with carbon costs. It now seems as having been an overreach. 
5.1.2  USA discussion 
The discussion in the USA and elsewhere (Australia, Korea, California) followed after the 
EU experience. Superficially, one may conclude that other jurisdictions have adopted 
similar approaches. However the debate was very much driven by local conditions and 
priorities, which differ from the EU by virtue of the type of economy, political systems 
arrangements, cultural and political realities, etc.  
In the US a good example is the Lieberman/Warner America’s Climate Security Act was 
debated,  but  not  passed,  in  June  2008.  This  act  included  a  number  of  provisions 
designed to address competitiveness concerns that were increasing in the US, especially 
as China, and other emerging economies, which are strong economic competitors (as 
outlined in Chapter 3), would not have to face similar carbon related costs. 
Some of these measures included at that time in this proposed legislation included: 
  Cost containment mechanisms, such as free allocation of allowances, the ability to 
bank  and  borrow  allowances,  provisions  for  the  use  of  offsets  and  price  caps  on 
allowances on the market.  
  Trade  measures:  mechanism  that  address  trade  disadvantages,  border  carbon 
adjustment (BCA) 
Table  3  below  illustrates  the  evolution  of  the  Lieberman-Warner  Bill  from  the 
committee stage, to when it was introduced in the Senate, and the diverse interventions 
that emerged during that period.  
Table 3. Evolution of the Lieberman-Warner Bill 
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A key component was the Carbon Market Efficiency Board, which could undertake a lot 
of measures to impact market functioning such as tighten or ease banking or borrowing, 
etc. 
A number of aspects were introduced from other proposed federal cap and trade bill, 
such as the as the requirement that importers purchase  allowances from a  separate 
international allowance pool. This provision could be triggered if the relevant trading 
partner had not adopted “comparable efforts to reduce emissions by 2020”. However, a 
key  plank  for  some  industrial  stakeholders,  the  safety  valve  or  price  cap,  was  not 
imported from other bills under consideration. 
One conclusion that needs to be internalised is that, at the time of the discussions over a 
Federal cap-and–trade bill, there seemed to be a broad consensus in the US regarding 
the introduction of a BCA. When that discussion returns a BCA is likely to be a starting 
point for discussion. 
5.2  Current Debate 
In 2013, carbon leakage and the CLL have again become central in the EU, given the 
confluence of issues over carbon pricing and climate change that are currently being 
debated. They include: 
  Backloading 
  EU ETS structural reform 
  2030 Energy and Climate Framework, including overlapping policies 
  Review of the CL list by 2014 
  2015 international agreement 
  Linking to Australia 
One  issue  that  needs  to  be  identified  is  that  there  are  two  streams  that  are  being 
discussed. One stream seems to aim to “fix” the EU ETS, whether by short-term fix, such 
as back loading, or longer term, more structural measures. What short term and long-
term  have  in  common  is  the  perception  among  some  stakeholders,  and  especially 
industry, that their final aim is to lift carbon prices in the EU ETS.  
The second activity, the review of the carbon leakage list, will have to be completed by 
the end 2014. It is a mandated review of the data and assumptions that underpin the 
algorithm for being on the carbon leakage list, and receiving free allowances. It could be 
modifying  certain  parameters,  with  the  result  of  removing  a  significant  number  of 
sectors and products from the carbon leakage list. The criteria themselves will remain 
the same. If a sector is dropped from the carbon leakage list the impact is the loss of an 
average  of  50%  of  free  allocation  for  the  five-year  period  between  2015  and  2019 
(European Commission, 2011a) 
Some industrialists perceive both of these streams as potentially working in the same 
direction  in  terms  of  disadvantaging  industry,  which  is  already  concerned  with 
competitiveness due to a number of other factors, such as energy costs, etc.  
Some level of stress exists between, on the one hand, the wish to keep a low carbon 
price, and on the other hand the desire to maintain the same carbon leakage list devised 
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The relationship between carbon price and carbon costs and the importance for the 
industrial base – and how these two strands interact– do not seem as well appreciated 
and understood as they should be. 
The discussion can be also seen as driven by two other important aspects. Firstly, due to 
a number of external conditions, many of the sectors under the ETS were left with a 
significant surplus of allowances provided for free during the second trading period. 
This lead to a perception, which is possibly inaccurate, of a windfall for these sectors, 
and elicited strong criticism from NGOs, especially at a time when the leakage list is 
under review. This is putting pressure for a stricter review of who is in danger from 
carbon costs and should be included in the carbon leakage list  
Secondly, and as mentioned earlier in this paper, emerging systems, or existing systems 
that  have  started  operation  recently,  all have  anti-leakage  provisions.  It  is,  however, 
virtually impossible to judge their effectiveness due to their limited time of operation, 
the resulting lack of data, external conditions and the free allocation that existed for 
many installations in the EU ETS until the end of 2012.   
5.2.1  Ex-post results 
However, most ex-post studies, limited as they may be,  seem to indicate little or no 
carbon  leakage  –  and  force  the  question:  Is  carbon  leakage  a  real  problem  or  is  it 
overblown?  As  expected,  any  substantive  discussion  will  be  around  the  largest  and 
longest operating carbon-pricing mechanism, the EU ETS. 
As discussed most of the analysis on carbon leakage was been done from an ex-ante 
point of view. This has resulted in forecasts of the type and magnitude of carbon leakage 
that can be expected from the EU ETS.  
At this time there is very little empirical evidence of the impact of carbon prices from the 
EU ETS on the industrial sectors discussed in Chapter 3 as being most exposed to risk of 
carbon leakage. A number of empirical studies are now emerging, including work that 
shows the indirect impact of the ETS carbon price on electricity prices, as well as others 
that refer directly to the impact of the EU ETS on products such as cement, steel, and 
primary aluminium. Table 4 below presents a selection of Ex-ante and Ex-post studies 
on carbon leakage. 
Table 4. A selection of Ex-ante and Ex-post studies on carbon leakage 
Study  Ex-ante/ 
Ex-post 
Sectors/geography 
coverage 
Estimated carbon leakage 
rates from EU to non-EU (%) 
Grubb and Counsell, 
2010 
Ex-ante  Electricity, steel, cement and 
aluminium/UK, US Poland 
and the EU 
0-39 
Demailly and Quirion, 
2008 
Ex-ante  Cement/Global  0-50 
Ponssard and Walker, 
2008 
Ex-ante  Cement/Western European  70-73 
Ritz, 2009  Ex-ante  Steel/EU ETS  9-75 
Chan, Li and Zhang, 
2012 
Ex-post  Power, cement, iron and 
steel/EU ETS 
For cement, iron and steel; no 
evidence of carbon leakage 
Ellerman, Convery 
and Perthius 
Ex-post  Oil refining, aluminium, iron 
and steel, cement 
No observed impact in the oil 
refining, cement, aluminium 
or steel 
Sartor, 2012  Ex-post  Aluminium  No strong evidence for 
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Ex-post  studies  have  generally  concluded that  there  was no  leakage  (Ellerman  et  al, 
2010;  Chan  et  al,  2012).  The  factors  that  have  been  put  forward  to  explain  this 
discrepancy are the following ones:  
-  The high level of free allocations  
-  Strategic barriers to trade 
-  Large fluctuations in the level of CO2 prices and/or low CO2 prices 
In the case of aluminium, an ex-post the study by Sartor (2012) shows little evidence of 
leakage for the aluminium industry.  
It has also been empirically observed that the relative EU level of economic activity has 
significantly influenced the trade flows.3 Climate policy (and regulatory uncertainty) in 
the EU certainly has had an impact on investment, together with other factors, such as 
social costs and energy costs.  
Since investments generate capacity constraints, which trigger imports, climate policy 
should be expected to have a significant long-term impact on leakage. Such an analysis 
remains to be done.  
Recent work done by CEPS for the EC looking at the impact of ETS prices on steel and 
aluminium is also very relevant, and discussed below.  
With respect to aluminium, Table 5 below shows the impact of ETS cost on productions 
costs for the period 2005-2012, as well as the impact of ETS cost on EBIDTA. The figures 
show that the impact of ETS on aluminium production can be seen as significant. The 
figure refers only to indirect and admin costs, as aluminium was not included in the ETS 
until the start of Phase 3.  
The  large  variation  in  the  ETS  costs/EBITDA  (Earnings  Before  Interest,  Taxation, 
Depreciation  and  Amortization)  ratio  is  explained  by  two  factors.  First,  the  strong 
fluctuations in the price of allowances in the period analyzed. Secondly, the economic 
fluctuations, with a boom in 2006-2007, and a strong downturn starting in 2008 also 
contribute to these results. 
Table 5. Aluminium ETS costs as a proportion of production costs and EBITDA 
Year  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
ETS cost/ 
production costs  11%  8%  0%  10%  7%  6%  6%  3% 
ETS costs/ 
EBITDA  38%  18%  1%  51%  99%  27%  30%  43% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Renda et al. (2013a). 
For steel, Table 6 below shows ex-post data in terms of the impact of direct and indirect 
costs of ETS on the steel industry, relative to EBIDTA. The steel industry was included in 
the EU ETS from the beginning, and as such some of the indirect costs were balanced, 
with the historical free allocation used in P1 and P2. Impacts in this case are less strong 
than in the case of aluminium.  
                                                        
3 This has been pointed out in Hourcade, J.-C., Demailly, D., Neuhoff, K. and Sato, M., 2008. Differentiation 
and  dynamics  of  EU  ETS  competitiveness  impacts:  final  report,  Report,  Climate  Strategies,  Cambridge, 
section 3, 60-93 and recently econometrically tested in Branger, Quirion and Chevallier, 2013, Carbon 
leakage and competitiveness of cement and steel industries under the EU ETS: Much ado about nothing. 
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Table 6. Steel ETS costs as a fraction of EBITDA 
Period  P1  P2 
BOF 
ETS costs/EBITDA 
0%  -9% 
EOF 
ETS costs/EBITDA 
5%  12% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Renda (2013b).  
Table 7. Steel total energy cost as a fraction of EBITDA 
  2010  2011  2012 
EAF-WR  116.6%  105.8%  108.8% 
BOF-HRC  45.5%  43.7%  52.6% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Egenhofer et al. (2013). 
Table 7, is included to compare the impact of ETS and energy costs on EBIDTA. It is clear 
that energy plays a much more dominant role in the cost structure than carbon, and 
points to the relatively low impact of ETS.  
5.2.2  What does the future hold? 
In addition, there is continued uncertainty and a lack of clarity on what the provisions of 
the  2015  international  agreement  will  look  like,  and  whether  other  national 
jurisdictions  will  also  impose  a  comparable  carbon  cost  on  industries  that  compete 
globally. 
It is therefore to be expected that there is an increase in the interest on how carbon 
leakage will be addressed in the EU to 2020, and beyond. It must be noted that the EU 
ETS Directive is silent on the fate of the current anti-leakage measures post-2020.  
In addition, the current debate in the EU over carbon leakage is also being influenced by 
what has  been  learned  from other jurisdictions.  In  a  changing  and  globalised  world, 
where the IPCC has again signalled urgency through its Fifth Assessment report the EU 
cannot  be  indifferent  on  how  carbon  pricing  (or  the  absence  of),  and  anti-leakage 
provisions,  are  treated  by  its  competitors.  Analysis  shows  different  approaches  and 
priorities in other jurisdictions, which is true in terms of: 
  Priority to address climate change (leading with energy or climate policies). 
  Addressing interaction between the EU ETS and other policies and measures that 
impact climate change and the price of carbon. These policies overlap and the lack of 
active coordination and will impede the carbon price signal. 
  Decision on the role that carbon pricing plays in climate policy. Carbon pricing is, and 
must  be  seen,  as  a  tool  for  price  discovery,  but  it  cannot  be  expected  to  do 
everything.  For  example,  the  California  ‘complementary  measures’  are  doing  the 
heavy lifting to ensure GHG reductions, while the ETS is seen, to some degree, as the 
‘safety  precaution’  in  case  those  measures  do  not  perform  as  expected.  In 
comparison the primary mechanism for CO2 reduction in the EU is the EU ETS. In 
addition, carbon markets are new, and their price signal, if left alone, will only have 
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Concerns  regarding carbon  leakage are not  about  the  past,  but  about  the  future. As 
discussed, current data do not seem to indicate that carbon leakage has been a decisive, 
or  even  influential  factor,  but  the  ex-post  analysis  is  just  now  taking  place,  and  the 
information is emerging. In addition, as mentioned before, existing studies cover direct 
carbon  costs  and  do  not  include  indirect  costs.  It  is  also  mostly  directed  towards 
production leakage. 
At the same time, it is difficult to tell to what extent the future will be a reflection of the 
past, given the changes in variables during the second trading period (P2), and the fact 
that in many ways the EU ETS in the third trading period (P3) and beyond, may look 
very different.  
The outcome of current discussions that are shaping the future of EU climate policy and 
of the EU ETS, as with every political negotiation, is far from certain. The same is true 
about  the  international  climate  regime  that  will  be  in  place  post-2020,  the  global 
economy, etc. 
The EU ETS P1 and P2 were seen, to some degree, as very important and useful tests, 
and a way to understand the impact of carbon pricing on the economy, trade flows, 
carbon leakage, etc. The largest experiment with carbon pricing, the EU ETS, was run 
with dramatically changed external conditions in terms of key parameters, including: 
  Changes in global GHG emissions patterns,  
  Changes in the global economic order and a 
  Departure from key assumptions on energy price data. 
In addition, sourcing and investment decisions are rarely, if ever, made on the basis of 
one variable alone, but a combination of many factors, each carrying a weight, which will 
vary from occasion to occasion. 
The past may not be a good indicator of the future and therefore provisions must be 
available to address carbon leakage in a flexible way, which will work under different 
scenarios. Many issues may change in the future such as: 
  More stringent caps 
  Higher price for carbon in the EU and internationally 
  Shrinking amount of free allowances available (in 2013 at 809,315,756) as it declines 
at a rate of 1.74% a year, resulting in lower free allocation for those that are on the 
leakage list 
  Economic recovery and growth 
  A new international climate change regime with contributions from all 
  Carbon  pricing  at  the  domestic  level  in  different  jurisdictions  –  Is  this  going  to 
become a reality or a perpetual promise? 
  Evolution and prices in energy markets. The EU has a certain structure for energy 
markets  and  energy  prices  are  very  much  aligned  with  that  model.  In  many 
jurisdictions energy prices are negotiated and not the result of market forces which 
have also a significant influence on competitiveness. Note that indirect costs can be 
alleviated by self-generation, contracts with carbon-neutral generators or long-term 
contracts. Long-term contracts are important for large baseline consumers (such as 
primary aluminium plants) and although these are allowed in the EU, there are strict 
conditions imposed by case law. Many long-term contracts are due to expire between 28  MARCU, EGENHOFER, ROTH & STOEFS 
 
2014  and  2016,  which  will  expose  large  industrial  electricity  consumers  to  the 
carbon price embedded in their electricity.  
Now is the time to understand what are the options for the future as safety measures to 
prevent carbon leakage. The key questions to explore are:  
  What are the options? 
  What are the criteria by which to judge those options? 
  How does each option stack up against these criteria? 
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Annex 
Fact Sheets on Carbon Pricing Mechanisms  
Factsheet 1: EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
Criteria for leakage 
provision 
There  are  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  criteria  in  place.  The 
quantitative criteria are based on cost increases due to the ETS and trade 
exposure  (the  precise  criteria  and  thresholds  are  listed  below).  If  an 
activity  has  borderline  values  after  an  assessment  based  on  the 
quantitative criteria, several qualitative criteria can be taken into account. 
These qualitative criteria are also listed below. 
Coverage of leakage 
provision 
Approximately 160 sectors and sub-sectors are on the Leakage List. 
District  heating  and  high  efficiency  cogeneration  also  receive  free 
allocation, although they are not on the leakage list. 
Cost-
containment 
measures 
Free 
allocation 
Sectors and activities that are on the Leakage List receive 100% of the 
benchmarked allocation for free. Generally the product benchmarks are set 
at  the  average  emissions  intensity  of  production  of  the  10%  least 
emissions-intensive installations at EU level.  
Free allocation for activities not on the List is currently set at 80% of the 
benchmark. This will decrease to 30% by 2020. 
There is currently no clarity on leakage provision post-2020. 
The explanation above simplifies the actual provisions of the cross-sectoral 
correction  factor.  This  correction  factor  is  uniformly  applied  to  all  free 
allocation to ensure that the sum of preliminary total free allocation (as 
submitted by member states) does not exceed the Union-wide limit. 
Offsets 
and 
linking 
Linking  negotiations  are  going  ahead  with  Australia  and  Switzerland. 
Linking with Switzerland could be completed in 2014. The timeline for 
linking  with  Australia  has  become  uncertain  due  to  the  change  of 
government in Australia after the general election of 7 September 2013. 
Previously a one-way link was to be operational in 2015 and full linking in 
2018. Offsets: post 2012 only CDM projects from LDCs are accepted. In 
addition, post-2012 CERs may not derive from industrial gas projects. In 
the current trading periods quantitative limitations apply. 
Installations  that  received  free  allocation  or  were  entitled  to  use 
international credits over the period 2008-12 can continue to do so up to 
whichever of the following amounts is higher: 
a)  The amount allowed in Phase 2 (2008-12) 
b)  The amount corresponding to 11% of its allocation in Phase 2. 
Stationary  installations  that  did  not  receive  free  allocation  or  were  not 
entitled  to  use  international  credits  in  Phase  2  shall  be  entitled  to 
international credits in the period 2008-20 to cover a maximum of 4.5% of 
its verified emissions over the period 2013-20.  
These limitations translate into a quantitative cap of around 1.6-1.8 billion 
(projection  from  ICIS)  CERs  and  ERUs  than  can  be  surrendered  before 
2020. 
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  Measures 
to address 
price 
volatility 
A measure is in place to respond to ‘excessive price fluctuations’. If, for 
more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three 
times the average price of allowances during the two preceding years, a 
meeting  of  the  Climate  Change  Committee  shall  be  convened.  This 
Committee can implement two measures (if the high price is not due to 
changing market fundamentals): 
1)  Bring forward the auctioning of a part of the total allowances to be 
auctioned 
2)  Auction up to 25% of the allowances in the new entrant’s reserve.  
Structural  reform  discussion  is  currently  underway;  one  option  on  the 
table is a supply side flexibility mechanism, which might be in the form of 
an allowance reserve. 
Banking  Unlimited  banking  is  allowed,  although  this  was  not  the  case  between 
Phase 1 (Pilot Phase 2005-07) and Phase 2 (2008-12). 
Borrowing is allowed to some degree, because allocation for the following 
year is made before allowances have to be surrendered for the previous 
year. 
Compensation and 
support measures 
State-aid guidelines allow member states to compensate domestic industry 
for indirect costs (incurred due to increased electricity prices caused by 
the  EU  ETS).  Those  compensation  measures  shall  be  based  on  ex-ante 
benchmarks of the indirect emissions of CO2 per unit of production. The 
European Commission needs to approve any compensation falling in the 
scope of these guidelines. 
Member states also have the option to issue transitional free allocation for 
the  modernisation  of  electricity  generation,  although  under  strict 
conditions. 
Review mechanism for 
leakage provisions 
Leakage List is reviewed every 5 years, this review not only looks at the list 
itself, but also the criteria and mechanisms used while compiling the list. 
The first review is currently ongoing and is scheduled to be finalised by the 
end of 2014. Every year, (sub-) sectors can be added if it is demonstrated 
that  a  (sub-)  sector  fulfills  the  criteria  below.  The  initialisation  of  this 
sectoral review can be done by the European Commission or at the request 
of a member state. 
Complementary measures  Among the most prominent complementary measures in the EU are the 
two  other  pillars  of  the  20-20-20  target  (the  first  pillar  reducing  GHG 
emissions): a Renewable Energy target of 20% by 2020 and an Energy 
Efficiency target of reducing primary energy consumption by 20%. 
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Additional Notes: 
EU ETS leakage list criteria 
If an activity fulfils any of the following three thresholds, they are added to the leakage 
list: 
a)  Direct and indirect costs increase production costs  by at least 5% of gross value 
added  and  trade  intensity  (calculated  as  the  value  of  imports  plus  exports  over 
annual turnover plus imports) is over 10%, 
b)  Direct and indirect costs increase production costs by at least 30% or 
c)  Trade intensity is over 30%. 
Please note that for the calculations of ETS-related costs a price of €30 per EUA was 
considered.  This  price  might  also  be  reconsidered  during  the  ongoing  review  of  the 
leakage list. 
If  a  sector  has  borderline  values  on  the  quantitative  criteria,  then  the  following 
qualitative criteria can be considered:  
a)  Emissions  levels  and  electricity  consumption  reduction  potential  of  individual 
installations in the sector,  
b)  Current and projected market characteristics and 
c)  Profit margins as an indicator of long-term investment or relocation decisions. 
The focal point of the approach to leakage in the EU ETS is the leakage list. Sectors and 
activities on this list receive a larger proportion of free allocation (with respect to their 
compliance obligations) than sectors that are not on the list. If an installation is among 
the most carbon-efficient entities in the sector and production has not increased beyond 
production  in  the  reference  years  (the  three  most-recent  years  for  which  data  are 
available),  that  installation  receives  full  free  allocation  (if  we  do  not  take  the  cross-
sectoral correction factor into account).  
The leakage list itself is, however, extremely  long and covers a very wide variety of 
activities. 
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Factsheet 2: Australia Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) 
This  analysis  is  based  on  the  CPM  as  it  was  proposed  and  implemented  before  the 
Australian general election of 7 September 2013. The new Conservative government has 
indicated it will attempt to repeal the CPM. Draft repeal legislation was released for public 
comment on 14 October 2013. The repeal legislation will be introduced into Parliament in 
its first sitting week (early November) but may not be able to be passed until changes to 
the composition in the Senate occur on 1 July 2014. 
Criteria for leakage 
provision 
Industry  must  be  Emissions  Intensive  and  Trade  Exposed  (EITE) 
industries.  
  Trade exposed: Sum of imports and exports is larger than 10% of 
domestic production for sector or product in one of the financial 
years  2004-05,  2005-06  or  2007-08;  or  there  being  a 
demonstrated lack of capacity to pass through costs due to  the 
potential for international competition. 
  Emissions intensity defined over either industry revenue or added 
value: 
Highly  emissions-intensive  activities:  At  least  2,000  tCO2e 
emissions per million AUD revenue or 6,000 tCO2e emissions per 
million AUD of value added 
Moderately  emissions-intensive  activities:  At  least  1,000  tCO2e 
emissions per million AUD revenue or 3,000 tCO2e emissions per 
million AUD value added 
Allocation for both categories declines by 1.3% yearly. 
Coverage of leakage 
provision 
Moderately  emissions-intensive  activities:  15  sectors  on  list.  Highly 
emissions-intensive activities: 34 sectors on list.  
Cost-
containment 
measures 
Free 
allocation 
‘Jobs and Competitiveness’ programme: 
Output-based  free  allocation,  linked  to  historical  industry-average 
emissions for EITE industries:  
Moderately emissions-intensive activities: 66% free allocation 
Highly emissions-intensive activities: 94.5% free allocation 
Liquefied natural gas receives 50% of allocation for free. 
Energy  Security  Fund:  Coal-fired  generators  with  emissions  intensity 
above 1.0 tCO2/MWh collectively receive 41.7 million permits annually for 
four years. 
  Offsets and 
linking 
Linking negotiations had been progressing with the EU ETS and Australian 
legislation passed to facilitate such linkage (2015-18 one-way linking, after 
2018 full link). A review of linking options with the NZ ETS has also been 
conducted. Linking is seen as a key cost-containment mechanism. 
Domestic  offsets:  Carbon  Farming  Initiative  (CFI),  a  scheme  aiming  at 
sequestering carbon via agriculture or reducing emissions from land-use. 
Quantitative limit on offsets from CFI is set at maximum 5% of compliance 
obligation till mid-2015. There is no limit after mid-2015. 
International  credits can also  be  used  from  mid-2015  onwards  up  to  a 
maximum of 50% of an entity’s compliance obligations. The limits for CERs 
and  ERUs  have  been  announced  at  maximum  of  12.5%  of  an  entity’s 
compliance  obligation.  Another  source  of  international  units  are  EUAs 
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  Measures 
to address 
price 
volatility 
First phase (mid-2013 till mid-2015) has a fixed price (23 AUD in 2013; 
increases to 25.40 AUD in 2015); allowances are to be bought directly from 
the government (and surplus allowances from free allocation can be sold to 
the government). 
Floating price with a price ceiling in Phase 2 (mid-2015 till mid-2018); 
price maximum is 20 AUD above the EUA price. The price ceiling is to be 
dropped after mid-2018. 
Banking 
and 
borrowing 
Banking and limited borrowing of carbon units is allowed in the flexible 
price period to enhance the efficiency of the carbon market. 
Unlimited banking of carbon units is allowed in the flexible price period. 
Compensation and 
support mechanisms 
5.5 billion AUD Energy Security Fund was originally available for coal-fired 
generators  through  a  “contracts  for  closure”  programme  to  speed  and 
soften  transition  to  low-carbon  generation.  Coal-fired  generators  with 
emissions  intensity  above  1.0  tCO2/Mwh  collectively  received  1  billion 
AUD in cash during 2011-12.  
This programme has been abandoned. 
A fund of 300 million AUD has been made available to aid innovation and 
investment within the steel sector. 
Underground coal mines with high fugitive emissions intensity are also 
eligible for 982 million AUD industry support over 6 years. 
Review mechanism for 
leakage provisions 
Yearly application rounds for industry to join Jobs and Competitiveness 
Programme. Major review by the Productivity Commission is scheduled for 
2014-15 and at regular intervals after that. 
Complementary measures  Australian  Renewable  Energy  Agency  was  established  to  oversee  3.2 
billion AUD for research and development of new energy technologies. 
Clean Technology Program was established to distribute 1.2 billion AUD in 
grants for projects that develop and deploy emissions-reducing technology 
in agriculture and manufacturing. Funding for these programmes was cut 
during the 2013 budget process. 
Clean Energy Future Corporation to manage a 10 billion AUD fund for co-
investments  in  commercial  renewable  energy  and  energy  efficiency 
projects. 
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Factsheet 3: California Cap-and-Trade 
Criteria for leakage provision  Industry  Assistance  Factor  is  defined  as a  combination  of  emissions 
intensity and trade exposure (see Tables A1 and A2 for details on how 
these two criteria are combined). 
Emissions  intensity  (very  low  to  high):  tonnes  CO2e  emitted  per  $1 
million value added.  
Trade  exposure  (low  to  high):  imports  plus  exports  over  total 
shipments plus imports. 
Entities importing electricity into California from neighbouring states 
and Canada have to account for the emissions related to generating that 
electricity. 
Coverage of leakage 
provision 
High risk: 15 sectors 
Medium risk: 14 sectors 
Low risk: 3 sectors 
Cost-
containment 
measures 
Free 
allocation 
Industry  assistance  factor  is  different  over  three  initial  compliance 
periods (CP) and over high, medium and low leakage risk industries. 
Allocation is determined via a sector-specific intensity benchmark and 
is  output-based.  Initially  the  benchmarks  are  set  at  about  90%  of 
average emissions. Free allocation is declining over time.  
High-risk industries will receive 100% of the benchmark for free till at 
least 2020. 
Medium-risk industries receive 100% for free in CP1, declining to 50% 
in 2020. 
Low-risk  industries  also  receive  100%  for  free  initially,  declining  to 
30% in 2020. 
There is no clarity on how this will evolve post-2020, although at the 
beginning  of  October  2013  the  CARB  released  a  draft update  to  the 
initial  Scoping  Plan  (in  which  the  practical  implementation  and 
planning  of  California’s  Global  Warming  Solutions  Act  of  2006,  or 
Assembly Bill (AB) 32). 
Offsets and 
linking 
Domestic and international offsets which follow four protocols (ozone 
depleting substance, livestock, urban forests and US forest projects) are 
accepted; more protocols could be added. 
At the moment offsets are accepted by the US, but there is a framework 
for accepting international credits and negotiations are ongoing with 
respect to REDD+ projects from several Mexican and Brazilian states. 
Quantitative limit: up to 8% of compliance obligation can be covered 
using  offsets  (of  which  international  offsets  can  be  one-quarter  in 
compliance period 1, and one-half in compliance periods 2 and 3). 
Link with Quebec is being established; the first joint auction should be 
held  in  January  2014.  Both  are  partners  of  the  Western  Climate 
Initiative.  
Measures to 
address price 
volatility 
The Allowance Price Containment Reserve (APCR) receives allowances 
every budget year and holds auction every quarter at pre-established 
prices.  In  budget  years  2013  and  2014,  1%  of  the  total  number  of 
allowances enters the APCR, 4% for budget years 2015-17 and 7% for 
budget years 2018-20.  CARBON LEAKAGE: AN OVERVIEW  41 
 
The allowances in the APCR are split into three equal segments. These 
three segments are made available for auction with respective price 
levels of $40, $45 and $50 (2013). These prices increase yearly by 5% 
plus inflation. 
The APCR is linked to a floor price ($10 in 2012, increasing yearly): 
allowances that remain unsold at government auctions (because the 
value of the allowance is deemed less than the floor price) enter the 
APCR. 
  Banking and 
borrowing 
A number of flexibility mechanisms are included in the Californian Cap-
and-Trade programme.  
First: covered entities surrender allowances in two phases. At the end 
of each compliance period, entities must surrender allowances to cover 
at least 30% of their previous year’s emissions. One year after the end 
of each compliance period, entities surrender allowances for emissions 
that were not yet covered. This ‘true-up’ allows new data to be used 
and is a form of intra-compliance period borrowing.  
Borrowing  from  future  periods  is  also  allowed  if  it  is  used  for 
compliance obligations, but not for speculation.  
Entities have two holding limits: one holding limit for allowances that 
are eligible for compliance in the current compliance period, and one 
holding  limit  for  units  that  can  be  used  in  future  years.  Both  are 
calculated  as  a  base  limit  plus  a  fraction  of  that  entity’s  annual 
allowance budget. Banking is allowed as long as both holding limits are 
respected. 
Compensation and support 
mechanisms 
Private  electricity  distribution  utilities  (EDU)  are  granted  free 
allocation  at  90%  of  2008  emissions.  From  2013  onwards  all  these 
allowances must be auctioned and the proceeds of those auctions are 
earmarked to compensate each EDU’s customer for any price increased 
caused by the cap-and-trade system. A proposal by the California Public 
Utilities  Commission  would  limit  the  compensation  scheme  to 
households  and  small  businesses  (consuming  less  than  20  kWh)  to 
keep motivating large electricity consumers to increase their electricity 
efficiency. 
Energy-intensive  installations  can  opt  to  have  their  allowance  cap 
determined on the basis of their energy consumption instead of their 
production output. 
Review mechanism for 
leakage provisions 
Yearly  revision  of  allocations  and  benchmarks.  The  leakage  risk 
classification  of  any  sector  can  be  reviewed  after  the  California  Air 
Resources Board approves a request by the sector itself. 
Complementary measures  A  myriad  of  complementary  measures  (all  part  of  the  2008  AB  32 
Scoping Plan) have been implemented or proposed in California. These 
include  energy-efficiency  initiatives,  building  standards,  performance 
standards for cars, renewable targets (among which 33% renewable by 
2020)  and  the  Low  Carbon  Fuel  Standard.  The  Cap-and-Trade 
programme  is  called  the  ‘cornerstone’  of  the  larger  plan:  if  the 
complementary  measures  fail  to  produce  the  desired  emissions 
reductions, the Cap-and-Trade programme will ensure them.  
Around 22.5% of the desired emissions reductions are to be provided 
by  the  Cap-and-Trade  programme,  the  complementary  measures 
should pull the rest of the weight.  
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Additional notes: 
The  following  two  tables  give  an  overview  of  how  the  sectoral  leakage  risk 
classifications  are  calculated.  Table  A1  presents  the  threshold  values  for  emissions 
intensity and trade exposure, Table A2 shows how these two criteria are combined to 
establish one risk classification. 
Table A1. Leakage criteria thresholds 
Emissions intensity 
Risk level  Threshold (tCO2e/$ million Value added 
High  > 5000 
Medium  1000 – 4999 
Low  100 – 999 
Very Low  < 100 
Trade exposure 
Risk level  Threshold (imports + exports)/(shipments + imports) 
High  > 19% 
Medium  10% – 19% 
Low  <10% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on California Assembly Bill 32. 
Table A2. Leakage risk categorisation in Californian Cap-and-Trade 
 
Source: Air Resource Board public workshop on Emissions Leakage, 
Research and Monitoring, 30 July 2012. 
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Factsheet 4: Quebec Cap-and-Trade 
The Quebec Cap-and-Trade is one of the main partners of the Western Climate Initiative 
(WCI) (along with California).  
Criteria for leakage 
provision 
List of sectors at risk was defined at a political level, and as such there are 
no known objective leakage criteria. 
Coverage of leakage 
provision 
8  sectors  receive  assistance  in  the  form  of  free  allowances:  Aluminium, 
Lime,  Cement,  Chemical  and  petrochemical  industry,  Metallurgy,  Mining 
and pelletizing, Pulp and paper and Petroleum Refining. 
4  sub-sectors  also  receive  free  allowances:  manufacturers  of  glass 
containers, electrodes, gypsum products and some agri-food establishment. 
Cost-
containment 
measures 
Free 
allocation 
Free  allowances  will  be  provided  to  the  sectors  listed  above.  There  are 
yearly caps on free allowances to be distributed by the Ministry. For 2013 
this cap is 23.30 million units. This cap will reach a maximum of 65.30 
million units in 2015 and then decrease to 54.74 million units in 2020. 
The allocation per entity is based on average historical emissions intensity 
for  2011  and  adjusted  for  production  output,  with  100%  allocation  for 
process emissions, 80% for combustion emissions and 100% for emissions 
from other sources. 
Free allowances are also available for electricity imported from cap-and-
trade systems that are not linked to Quebec. 
Offsets and 
linking 
Offsets  are  accepted,  but  both  the  types  of  offsets  and  the  geographical 
source  are  limited.  Three  protocols  have  been  accepted:  agricultural 
methane destruction and small landfill site methane destruction (both only 
in Quebec) and Ozone Depleting Substance (ODS) destruction (in Canada 
and US, but ODS must originate in Canada). 
8% of compliance obligations can be covered by offsets. Credits for early 
action can also be used for compliance. 
Link with California is being implemented. Other partners within WCI could 
join that link.  
Measures 
to address 
price 
volatility 
An  allowance  reserve  is  supervised  by  the  Minister  of  Sustainable 
Development, Environment, Wildlife and Parks. This reserve is filled with 
percentages of the allowances under the cap (1% in 2013-14; 4% in 2015-
17; 7% in 2018-20 and 4% beyond 2020). The reserve is used as a soft 
price  ceiling.  The  allowances  in  the  reserve  are  split  into  three  equal 
segments.  These  three  segments  are  made  available  for  auction  with 
respective price levels of 40 CAD, 45 CAD and 50 CAD (2013 prices), once 
those same price levels are reached in the market. The three price levels 
increase  yearly  by  5%  plus  inflation.  Only  entities  that  are  not  holding 
allowances  in  their  general  account  are  eligible  to  join  sales  from  the 
reserve. These allowances go straight to compliance accounts. 
Allowances  in  the  reserve  can also  be  used  to  change  the  levels  of  free 
allocation at the discretion of the Ministry. 
A floor price of 15 CAD was established in 2012. This floor price increases 
by 5% (plus inflation) yearly. 
Banking  There is a holding limit for banking allowances. 
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Review mechanism for 
leakage provisions 
Review mechanism is not very transparent and has some room for political 
maneuverability.  There  is  no  clear  timeline  for  reviewing  provisions  or 
coverage. 
Complementary 
measures 
Revenues from auctions will be transferred to the Green Fund, with the 
stated goals of financing GHG reductions, compensation for economic and 
social impacts of GHG-mitigation policies, adaptation and public awareness 
campaigns. 
 
Additional Notes: 
The  Quebec  Cap-and-Trade  scheme  is  characterised  by  its  degree  of  political 
manoeuvrability.  The  sectors  eligible  for  free  allowances  and  the  amount  of  free 
allocation are not set in stone and can be reviewed by the Ministry if and when it is 
deemed necessary. The auction calendar is also subject to political decisions. 
Two additional exceptional issues should be noted: 
  Electricity  imported  from  other  cap-and-trade  systems  that  are  not  linked  to 
Quebec’s system is also eligible for free allocation. 
  From 2015 to 2020, free allocation decreases annually, determined by an emissions-
intensity target that also decreases annually. Different industrial activities will see 
different levels of decrease. 
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Factsheet 5: New Zealand ETS 
Starting in 2008 with the forestry sector, the New Zealand ETS has gradually expanded. In 
2010  energy  and  industry  joined  and  in  2013  synthetic  gases  and  waste  sectors  were 
included.  Agriculture  has  had  a  mandatory  reporting  obligation  for  biological  on-farm 
emissions from 2012 and  was  previously legislated to have surrendered  obligations for 
these emissions from 2015, but this has been placed on hold indefinitely.  
Criteria for leakage 
provision 
Eligible industries are divided into highly emissions-intensive industry and 
moderately  emissions-intensive.  Highly  emissions-intensive  industry: 
1,600 t/million NZD (or 4% of revenue at 25 NZD/t). Moderate emissions-
intensive: 800 t/million NZD (or 2% of revenues at 25 NZD/t). When there 
are obligations to surrender for biological emissions from agriculture, then 
participants  will  be  able  to  apply  for  an  allocation  of  NZUs.  One-off 
allocations were given to fisheries and forest for compensation for higher 
costs.  
Coverage of leakage 
provision 
Eligible industries currently receive an allocation of allowances (forestry, 
fishing  and  industry).  Should  agriculture  be  obliged  to  surrender 
allowances in the future, then they will be able to apply for an allocation of 
NZUs.  
Cost-
containment 
measures 
Free 
allocation 
For eligible industries, free allocation is determined by product baselines. 
90% free allocation for highly emissions-intensive actions and 60% free 
allocation  for  moderately  emissions-intensive  activities.  All  agriculture 
activities with ETS obligations will receive free allocation (covering 90% of 
an emissions baseline). 
There is no cap on free allocation; if production increases, so does free 
allocation.  
The  original  legislation  provided  for  a  gradual  phase-down  of  the 
allocation level at 1.3% per year after a transitional period – this period 
has been extended indefinitely 
Offsets  International trading of NZU was possible, as they could be exchanged for 
one AAU from New Zealand account up till 2013; as NZ voted out of KP 2. 
There is no quantity limit of KP CERs accepted into the scheme, but no 
CERs created after 2012 can be traded. There are some qualitative limits. 
Linking to other schemes was always part of the plan, although the EU and 
Australia  have  stated  that  some  significant  changes  to  the  NZ  ETS  are 
necessary before linking.  
Measures 
to address 
price 
volatility 
At the  moment,  there  are  two  transition  measures:  Fixed  price  on  (25 
NZD/allowance)  for  buying  from  the  government  and  obligation  to 
surrender only one allowance for two tonnes emitted for several sectors 
(liquid fossil fuels, stationary energy and industrial processes). It will also 
apply to waste and synthetic gases).  
Banking 
and 
borrowing 
There are no limits on banking in NZ ETS. 
Compensation and 
support mechanism 
Free allocation has also been used as compensation. One-off allocations 
were  provided  to  individuals  in  the  fishing  sector  to  compensate  for 
increased fuel costs and were also available to pre-1990 forestry owners to 
compensate for land-value effects of a deforestation liability. In addition, 
post-1989 forest owners can opt to receive an allocation of removal units 
(as  voluntary  ETS  participants)  but  this  also  implies  potential 
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Review mechanism for 
leakage provisions 
The Minister for Climate Change Issues has a discretionary power under 
statute to review the operation of the ETS at any time. The Government has 
indicated that the next ETS review will occur in 2015.  
Complementary 
measures 
Complementary  policies  include  a  90%  renewable  target  by  2025, 
measures to improve energy efficiency and agriculture research projects 
aimed at decreasing the emissions of the agriculture sector.  
 
Additional Notes: 
Allocation in the NZ ETS is intensity-based, meaning that it can increase as production in 
eligible activities increases. Hence, there is no absolute emissions limit on allocation for 
those sectors. Free allocation is used to manage leakage risk for the industrial (energy-
using) sector and potentially for agricultural on-farm biological emissions, should they 
face surrender obligations in the future (this would require legislative and regulatory 
changes).  
One-off allocations have also been provided as compensation for fishermen and pre-
1990 forest owners.  
In the NZ ETS there are no limits for trading domestic or approved international units, at 
least  until  the  end of  the  Kyoto  Protocol  CP1  ‘true-up’  period.  However,  since  NZ  is 
excluded from KP 2, no CERs can be traded that are created post-2012.  
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Factsheet 6: RGGI 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is currently in its second trading period, 
2013-14.  This  scheme  focuses  exclusively  on  power  generation.  RGGI  completed  a 
programme review and released an updated Model Rule in February 2013.  
Criteria for leakage 
provision 
Leakage has as yet not been a major concern (low prices), but is part of the 
work programme. After a 2012 Program Review, RGGI member states have 
stated that work is needed on identifying carbon leakage in the electricity 
sector.  
Coverage of leakage 
provision 
No leakage provision yet.  
Cost-
containment 
measures 
Free 
allocation 
No free allocation, 100% auctioning.  
Offsets  Entities can surrender offset credits for max 3.3% of total emissions. These 
offsets can only be from RGGI states or others states that have signed the 
MOU. No linking is planned to date. 
Measures 
to address 
price 
volatility 
Cost Containment Reserve (planned for 2014) if allowance prices were to 
exceed predefined  price level. In 2014, limit of 5 million allowances, 10 
million from 2015 onwards. The CCR allowances would be made available 
immediately in any auction in which demand for allowances at prices above 
the CCR trigger price exceeds the supply of allowances offered for sale in 
that auction prior to the addition of any CCR allowances.  
  If the CCR is triggered, the CCR allowances will only be sold at or 
above the CCR trigger price.  
  CCR triggers prices: $4 in 2014, $6 in 2015, $8 in 2016, and $10 in 
2017. Each year after 2017, the CCR trigger price will increase by 
2.5%. 
Each auction also has a reserve price, at which no allowances can be sold 
under. The current reserve price is $1.98 per allowance. The reserve price 
increases by 2.5% annually.  
Banking 
and 
borrowing 
Banking is allowed, although the cap for states is reviewed according to the 
amount of allowances banked in that state. 
Compensation and 
support measures 
All  revenues  from  auctioning  are  returned  to  the  state  and  invested  in 
consumer benefit programmes such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
climate change abatement and direct energy bill assistance.  
Review mechanism for 
leakage provisions 
Previous  programme  reviews  concluded  in  February  2013,  next 
comprehensive review is foreseen for 2016.  
Complementary 
measures 
Several  states  have  additional  state-specific  GHG  emissions  reduction 
policies, for example each RGGI state has a renewable portfolio standard.  
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Additional Notes: 
There  are  currently  no  leakage  provisions  in  the  RGGI  ETS  and  the  RGGI  does  not 
regulate emissions from electricity generated outside the region and then used within 
the region. If has been stated that work is needed on identifying carbon leakage, which is 
explicitly called for in the updated 2012 programme review. However, so far, the cap has 
had low effect on the relative sources of electricity. The risk may increase with the newly 
proposed emissions cap.  
RGGI  uses  three-year  compliance  periods,  to  offer  flexibility  to  covered  entities. 
Compliance periods also have flexible durations.  
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Factsheet 7: The US Waxman-Markey Bill 
The Waxman Markey Bill (H.R. 2454) was approved by the US House of Representatives in 
2009  but  later  defeated  in  the  Senate.  The  bill  includes  a  proposed  cap-and-trade 
programme.  
Criteria for leakage 
provision 
An entity is eligible to receive emission allowances rebates if it is in a sector 
that meets both criteria (i) and (ii), or criteria (iii):  
(i)  Energy/GHG intensity of at least 5%  
(ii)  Trade intensity of at least 15%  
(iii)  Energy or GHG intensity of at least 20%.  
Coverage of leakage 
provision 
EITE, coal generators and oil refineries.  
Cost-
containment 
measures 
Free 
allocation 
Output-based  allocation  for  eligible  EITE  entities:  Free  allocation with a 
continuously  updating  output-based  formula  for  direct  and  indirect 
emissions. Maximum 15% of the overall cap but declines in tandem with 
the  overall  cap.  After  2025,  default  phase-out  of  rebates  with  complete 
phase-out by 2035 (but can be delayed by the President).  
Emission allowances are also provided to merchant coal generators (50% 
of qualified emissions) and oil refineries.  
Offsets  Offsets could account for 2 billion tonnes of carbon. The percentage limit of 
offsets  for  entities  varies.  Moreover,  not  more  than  half  can  come  from 
domestic offsets and not more than half from international offsets.  
Measures 
to address 
price 
volatility 
Reserve price on auctions ($10 in 2012 and then increases with 5% per 
year).  
Strategic reserve auction. Allowances are offered at a threshold price. The 
following % of allowances will be held annually: 2012-19: 1%; 2020-29: 
2%; 2030-50: 3%. 
Banking 
and 
borrowing 
Two-year  rolling  compliance  period  with  unlimited  banking.  Unlimited 
next-year borrowing with no interest and borrowing up to 15% beyond 
that at 8% interest.  
Compensation and 
support mechanism 
The  bill  includes  support  for  electricity  and  natural  gas  distributors  to 
alleviate  price  increases  for  consumers,  green  jobs  and  retraining,  low-
income  consumers,  energy  efficiency  and  clean  energy  investments, 
deployment  of  clean  energy  technologies  in  developing  countries  and 
climate change adaptation measures.  
Review mechanism for 
leakage provisions 
The initial list of eligible industrial sectors was planned to be published in 
2011. From 2013, and every four years after, an updated version of the list 
would be published. 
Complementary 
measures 
Included  in  the  bill  is  the  International  Reserve  Allowance  Programme. 
Beginning in 2020, if a multinational agreement has not been reached, the 
programme could go into effect for covered industrial sectors where 15% 
or more of imports are from countries that do not meet criteria on GHG 
regulation,  emissions-intensity  and  emissions  levels.  The  Act  requires 
emissions allowances for the import of products in eligible sectors.  
The  bill’s  centrepiece  is  the  ETS,  but  it  also  includes  other  major 
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Additional Notes: 
The Waxman-Markey Bill includes output-based allocation to EITE entities. In addition 
utilities (electricity and gas local distribution companies) also receive allowances, with a 
clear mandate that the value of those allowances should be used to protect consumers 
from higher energy prices. This allocation, hence, offsets a portion of the effect that the 
cap-and-trade programme would have on production costs.  
The price intervention mechanism in the Waxman-Markey Bill includes both a reserve 
price on auctions (approximately 15% of allowances would be auctioned to start with) 
and a strategic reserve  auction, to keep prices from rising above a certain threshold 
level.  If  there  is  demand  for  allowances  above  the  threshold,  the  reserve  will  help 
contain prices that otherwise would have been above this level. If the market price is 
below this level, there would be no demand for these reserve allowances. 
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Factsheet 8: Korea Emissions Trading Scheme 
The Korea ETS is set to kick-off in January 2015, and as such the scheme has not been 
finalised yet. Two main legislative proposals still need to be published: the Master Plan (the 
main  regulatory  text)  and  the  National  Allocation  Plan  (which  includes  the  allocation 
procedures  and  criteria  for  free  allocation).  Drafts  are  scheduled  to  be  released  in  the 
course of Q1 2014 and the plans are expected to be confirmed in June 2014. There is still a 
high level of uncertainty surrounding the Korea ETS, and all the information provided in 
this paper relate to proposals issued in November 2012 and analysis thereof.  
Criteria for leakage 
provision 
Proposed  leakage  criteria  are  related  to  energy-intensive  and  trade-
exposed industries. 
Coverage of leakage 
provision 
Sectors  are  considered  EITE  if  they  experience:  1)  production  cost 
increases over 5% and trade intensity is over 10%; 2) production cost 
increases over 30% or 3) trade intensity is over 30%.  
Production costs are expressed as annual emissions of the sector times the 
price  of  allowances,  divided  by  the  annual  value  of  that  sector.  Trade 
intensity per sector is calculated as value of imports plus value of exports 
over total revenue of the sector plus value of imports. 
A list of sectors is not available yet. 
Cost-
containment 
measures 
Free 
allocation 
In the initial three trading periods auctioning will be limited. In Phase 1 
(2015-17) 100% of the cap will be free allocation, in Phase 2 (2017-20), 
97%  free  allocation  and  in  Phase  3  (2020-?)  90%  free  allocation. Both 
grandfathering and benchmarking are being considered for determining 
free allocation. EITE industries will receive 100% free allocation over the 
first three periods. 
Offsets and 
linking 
Proposed  limit  of  10%  compliance  obligation:  eligibility  of  offsets  is 
restricted  to  Korean  offsets;  the  list  of  eligible  offset  types  is  in 
development.  Installation  level  limits  will  be  reported  in  the  National 
Allocation Plan. International offsets to be accepted from 2021 onwards 
for 50% of total offset limit.  
Studies have been conducted by a research institute linked to the Korean 
government  related  to  linking  with  New  Zealand.  CEPS  is  currently 
involved in a study on linking possibilities between Korea and the EU ETS. 
  Measures 
to address 
price 
volatility 
Five measures are listed in the ETS Act and may be implemented: 
1)  Additional allocation of 25% of reserve allowance,  
2)  Setting max or min holding limit of allowance,  
3)  Expansion or limitation of borrowing limit,  
4)  Expansion of limitation of acceptance rate of offset and 
5)  Temporary setting of max or min price of allowance. 
Three  cases  have  been  specified  that  would  trigger  price  stabilisation 
measures are: 
1)  Price climb: for six consecutive months the allowance price is 3 
times higher than the average price over the previous three years.  
2)  Demand  climb:  the  average  price increases  more  than  two-fold 
due to a more than two-fold increase in trade volume from the 
average in a one-month period; and  
3)  Price crash: the price decreases more than 60% in a one-month 
period compared to the average price during the two prior years. 
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Compensation and 
support measures 
The proposed ETS allows for free allocation to support companies which 
would lose international competiveness. Financial and tax benefits could 
be granted on a project basis for mitigation technology development and 
diffusion, CCS development, GHG measuring and management, renewable 
energy and energy efficiency. 
Review mechanism for 
leakage provisions 
Not yet in place. 
 
   CARBON LEAKAGE: AN OVERVIEW  53 
 
Factsheet 9: China 
Seven  ETS  pilots’  first  trading  periods,  2013-15  are  part  of China’s  12th  five-year  plan 
(2011-15). The 13th five-year plan (2016-20) may include provisions for national emissions 
trading in China.  
Criteria for leakage 
provision 
The  Chinese  pilot  programmes  use  free  allocation  to  address  leakage. 
Allocation differs between the schemes; some use auctioning.  
There is very little publicly available information on the proposed national 
ETS and how it will address the issue of leakage. 
Coverage of leakage 
provision 
Unknown.  
Cost-
containment 
measures 
Free 
allocation 
Free allocation is currently the basis in the pilot schemes. Auctions have 
been  planned,  but  in  most  cases,  only  as  a  complementary  allocation 
method.  
Free allocation in the different ETS pilots:  
Beijing (Allocation for free or based on emissions intensity), Shanghai (full 
free allowances), Guangdong (historical emissions linked with a product 
benchmark),  Shenzhen  (pre-allocated  for  free  in  trial  period  based  on 
production  capacity),  Tianjin  (full  free  allocation),  Hubei  (historical 
emissions).  For  Chongqing  and  Zhejiang  there  are  no  publications  on 
criteria for leakage provision. 
Offsets  Domestic  offsets  (Chinese  Certified  Emissions  Reductions,  CCERs)  have 
been included as a cost-containment mechanism. Currently CCERs are the 
only offsets allowed. Limits are in place, but differ between pilot phases. 
Measures 
to address 
price 
volatility 
There is no information on price intervention mechanisms in the Market 
Readiness Proposal (MRP). For the national ETS, according to IETA, China is 
likely to establish a price containment mechanism to keep prices stable, but 
no details were provided in the MRP.  
Banking 
and 
borrowing 
Some pilots allow unlimited banking of surplus allowances.  
Compensation and 
support mechanism 
Unknown. 
Review mechanism for 
leakage provisions 
Currently no information on review mechanisms for leakage provisions.  
Complementary 
measures 
China is implementing or planning a variety of complementary measures. 
The  most  relevant  are  an  energy  intensity  target  of  16%  reduction  in 
energy consumption by 2015 and reducing carbon emissions per unit of 
GDP by 17% by 2015. 
 
Additional Notes: 
Regarding carbon leakage, there is currently some lack of clarity on how this will be 
addressed in the different pilot schemes and the announced national ETS. The Chinese 
pilot programmes use free allocation to address leakage. Leakage, however, might not be 54  MARCU, EGENHOFER, ROTH & STOEFS 
 
as large an issue in the Chinese pilot schemes due to the current low manufacturing cost 
in China. The carbon price needs to be relatively high to cancel out this competitive 
advantage.  
Drafts  on  national  ETS  mention  the  intention  to  include  largest  emitters  (could  be 
interpreted as the sectors with the largest emissions growth rates). Sectors with strong 
emissions reductions potential could also be included. The national ETS will start with 
including state-owned enterprises. Leakage will probably not be a large issue for state-
owned enterprises, but it is still too early to assess the national scheme as very little is 
publically known. 
As a cost-containment measure, domestic offsets have been included. The quantity limit 
on CCERs differs in the pilot schemes, and for some the limit is still unclear. There may 
be linking outside the national ETS in the future, but no further details on how this could 
be done is currently available.  
 
 
About the Carbon Leakage Project 
 
 
This paper is one of the deliverables of the CEPS project entitled “Carbon Leakage: Options 
for the EU”, co-funded by five EU member states (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland 
and the UK)  and seven companies from different sectors of the economy (BP, EdF, ENI, 
Hydro, Lafarge, Solvay and ThyssenKrupp Steel Europe). 
This project has two objectives, outlined below: 
1) To prepare options that can be used to address concerns regarding carbon leakage for: 
  EU internal discussions, e.g. in the discussion on the review of the Carbon Leakage list, 
EU  structural  reform,  treatment  of  carbon  leakage  in  the  EU  ETS  post  2020 
(specifically for Phase 4 of the EU ETS), and the 2030 energy climate framework. 
  International negotiations, e.g. negotiations on the international agreement on post 
2020 climate change regime that are to be concluded in 2015 at the Paris COP. 
  Bilateral discussions, e.g. in linking with Australia. 
2) To engage in a series of Outreach Workshops, which will use the two papers, produced by 
this project in order to stimulate a well-informed and active debate on this topic in the EU. 
It is not the intention of this project to provide a definitive answer, such as a proposed 
solution,  but  to  identify  Issues,  develop  Options  to  address  carbon  leakage,  as  well  as 
Criteria to appraise the different approaches identified. 
This project has a number of deliverables 
  Background Paper for discussion 
  Options Paper – which will outline policy options to address leakage,  and criteria to 
evaluate these options. 
  A number of workshops, some of them to Review the two papers produced, others that 
have an Outreach objective. 
Both papers are: 
  Intended to be “briefs for policy makers”. 
  Not intended to determine if there is leakage, or to what extent. 
  Intended to provide a menu for policy makers to help them determine what leakage 
provisions are most effective and make choices. 
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